Former deputy head of the presidential administration Dmitry Kozak, who resigned in 2025 and largely withdrew from public view, continues to attract significant media attention. Kozak himself appears to be deliberately avoiding the spotlight and any re-entry into the public arena.
RBC published details of a reform plan that Kozak had proposed to Vladimir Putin earlier in 2025. The document covered a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from the economy to the operations of the security services. Kozak warned the president of the risks posed by complete trade isolation, which would inevitably lead to Russia’s technological lag behind advanced nations. He also forecasted that the country could soon face heightened interethnic and interfaith tensions, the degradation of social and production infrastructure, and the impacts of climate change. In addition, the former deputy chief highlighted the challenge of younger generations entering public and political life, whose values might diverge from the priorities of state policy.
To avert this scenario, Kozak advocated a «democratic model» for Russia’s development. His proposed reforms included large-scale decriminalization of non-violent offences (primarily economic ones), the possibility of reviewing cases involving the nationalization of assets, a broad amnesty (without specifying exact categories of convicts), the depoliticization of security agencies, greater judicial independence, and stronger oversight of the siloviki.
Kozak likely expected to oversee the implementation of these reforms, either remaining as deputy head of the presidential administration or heading the Supreme Court. However, Vladimir Putin rejected the proposals and instead offered his associate the role of presidential envoy to the North-Western Federal District—a position with minimal influence on federal policy. Unsatisfied with this, Kozak submitted his resignation on personal grounds.
Popular Telegram channels and political commentators have fueled speculation about Kozak’s potential comeback, perhaps as a negotiator with Ukraine and Western countries, or as the leader of a party list in the State Duma elections. Some interpret his portrayal as a democrat and war opponent as a subtle Kremlin tactic. The reasoning is straightforward: public fatigue with the war is growing, support for peace talks is steadily increasing, economic hardships are becoming more acute, and fears of further deterioration are mounting. The image of a senior official advocating reforms and opposing protracted conflict could offer a segment of society some hope. The issue, however, is that Russia’s top leadership—and Vladimir Putin in particular—has no intention of fostering such hope. The president remains committed to continuing the war, viewing economic difficulties as manageable and even necessary for achieving strategic objectives.
The role of negotiator with the West (primarily the United States) is already effectively handled by Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund. If needed at the highest level, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin—who avoids harsh rhetoric on the «special military operation» and long refrained from using the term altogether—could be brought into the dialogue. Kozak’s participation in parliamentary elections seems even less plausible. United Russia maintains a firmly pro-war and statist stance, positioning itself as an anti-reform party. The LDPR and A Just Russia have gone further in their support for the war and ultra-patriotism. New People is largely the personal project of Alexey Nechayev, who is unlikely to tolerate sharing the stage with a charismatic figure like Kozak.
It is possible that the Kremlin occasionally deploys Kozak’s image and reports of his «liberal» views for short-term media impact, to mildly placate a war-weary public. Yet this effect dissipates quickly, making it improbable as the primary aim. More likely, the leaks about Kozak’s purported anti-war stance and reform ideas are directed first and foremost at Vladimir Putin himself and the leadership of the security structures. These stories serve as constant reminders that the former official holds views markedly at odds with the official Kremlin line—both on continuing the war and on the principles governing the security services, siloviki, and state apparatus as a whole.
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia is moving in the opposite direction: a wave of nationalizations is underway, and the number of criminal cases on economic and political charges continues to rise. Repeated references to Kozak’s positions are intended to definitively preclude any return to high-level politics. A similar media strategy was employed by Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc and Kozak’s bureaucratic rival, to strip the Putin associate of his powers and eventually his post. Highlighting Kozak’s proposals—clearly unpalatable to Putin—acts as an additional safeguard against any revival of his influence at a critical juncture, such as potential Ukraine talks or heightened pressure from big business or technocratic government figures, for whom Kozak’s experience, connections, and reputation as a pragmatist could make him a convenient situational ally.
What appears to outside observers as positive PR for the ex-deputy chief is, for the president and his inner circle, more likely black PR. Kozak’s opponents in the Kremlin have already learned to wield this tool effectively.
Balitsky and Kadyrov’s Tactics
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced that President Vladimir Putin had met with Yevgeny Balitsky, head of the Russian administration in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. According to Peskov, the discussion focused on socio-economic issues, though no transcript was published on the Kremlin’s website. Balitsky has long been in protracted conflict with the Kremlin’s political bloc. He has systematically sidelined outside appointees sent by Moscow to his administration and clashed with other officials. Recently, he entered open confrontation with Ella Pamfilova, head of the Central Election Commission, who opposed his dismissal of the regional election commission; the prosecution and courts sided with her. Balitsky, however, showed little haste in acknowledging his error.
The political bloc would evidently prefer to replace this uncooperative official, a former regional deputy in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Oblast. For Putin, however, the symbolic aspect matters: he extends conspicuous attention to the heads of occupied territories, meeting them separately. The Kremlin applies a similar approach to Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov.
Balitsky appears to be adopting some of Kadyrov’s methods. When Kadyrov’s conflicts with federal elites intensify or resignation rumors circulate, he actively seeks a personal audience with Putin. Afterward, details of the meeting typically emerge in the public domain, and scrutiny of Kadyrov noticeably subsides. Often, it remains unclear whether the meeting actually occurred: no recent joint photos of Kadyrov and Putin are released, no transcripts appear on the Kremlin site, and official confirmations are limited to brief statements from the press secretary.
For the time being, Balitsky’s critics will likely temper their attacks. However, Sergei Kiriyenko and his team are unlikely to abandon plans to replace the recalcitrant official, and new pretexts for pressure will always surface. Balitsky’s resources are objectively incomparable to Kadyrov’s: he has managed to leak information about one purported meeting with Putin but may lack the clout to arrange another «dialogue.»
