At a meeting with Chechen security forces, Ramzan Kadyrov publicly stated that Dagestani senator Suleiman Kerimov and two Dagestani State Duma deputies, Bekhkan Barakhoyev and Rizvan Kurbanov, had ordered his assassination and that he had witnesses to prove his allegations. The Chechen leader has promised to declare a blood feud against Dagestani businessmen and politicians if this information is confirmed. This is probably the first precedent in recent Russian political history for direct death threats from the head of a region to other senior members of the power vertical.
This was unheard of even in the 1990s, the period, which was dark and turbulent if one is to believe Kremlin’s official narrative. Back then, businessmen and politicians were routinely shot or stubbed in criminal disputes, but there were no threats of blood feuds voiced at official meetings. Even then, it was a red line and an unacceptable behavior for representatives of the authorities. Ramzan Kadyrov has long violated many explicit and implicit prohibitions of Putin’s power vertical: he organizes massive rallies in his support and publicly seeks a private meeting with Putin when he feels his grip on power is challenged. Now he has moved on to break some more rules of conduct. Crossing red lines is Ramzan Kadyrov’s usual tactic for achieving his political and business goals. Breaking the rules attracts attention, including Putin’s, and Putin tends to play along with Kadyrov. For the Russian president, the question of a loyal Chechnya that is an integral part of the Russian Federation is crucial: Putin came to power capitalizing on the resolution of the Chechen issue. The end of the protracted Chechen wars has long been seen as Putin’s main achievement. Ramzan Kadyrov has clearly succeeded in selling the Russian leader the image of himself as the only guarantor of stability in the formerly rebellious republic, and Putin is clinging to him.
Now the Chechen leader is busy solving a rather straightforward problem. In August, he publicly intervened in a business dispute (and that’s another red line for a Russian official). In the summer, Tatiana Bakalchuk, head of Russia’s largest online retailer, Wildberries, announced that her company was merging with a large outdoor advertising operator RUSS Group. The deal was approved in the Kremlin and, according to media reports, high-ranking officials such as Anton Vaino, head of the presidential administration, were involved in its coordination. Tatiana’s husband, Vladislav Bakalchuk, objected to the merger and appealed to Ramzan Kadyrov for help. Kadyrov promised to sort things out, send his «boys» and «bring Vladislav’s wife home». In September, a deadly shoot-out between Bakalchuk and some Chechens outside the Wildberries office in downtown Moscow left two guards (both ethnic Ingush) dead and a policeman wounded. The elites were shocked by what they saw as the return of the criminal practices of the «turbulent 1990s» and were waiting for a reaction from the country’s top leadership. It seems that Kadyrov was also waiting: a new chance to engage in a conversation with Putin could help him in the corporate conflict.
However, nothing serious happened: the police opened a criminal case against the ordinary participants in the showdown, Vladislav Bakalchuk was interrogated and released, and the president and the heads of law enforcement agencies remained silent. Wildberries remained in the hands of Tatiana Kim (who returned to her maiden name after divorcing her husband). Kadyrov’s tactics clashed with those of Putin, who in crisis situations tries to keep silent and not intervene, hoping that the crisis will resolve itself. So far, in the struggle between these two tactics, the tactic of the Chechen leader, who is ready for new aggravations and does not let the crisis subside, has won. In a way, Ramzan Kadyrov’s actions are understandable; he has offered himself to Kim’s former husband as a «protection racket» and publicly promised him to return his assets. So far, this has not happened and questions are being raised about the effectiveness of Kadyrov’ «services». In order to remove these questions and resolve the conflict in the way he wants, Kadyrov is forced to become even more radical.
The announcement of a blood feud against certain prominent Dagestanis (Dagestan is known for its strong anti-Kadyrov sentiments) challenges the question of peaceful coexistence in the Caucasus. It is as if Kadyrov is saying to the Kremlin: «Is this online retailer, albeit the largest one in the nation, worth safeguarding this peace?» The fragile stability in the Caucasus is one of the cornerstones of Putin’s popularity and of the entire power vertical with the Russian president at the top. Ramzan Kadyrov is well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of this system, and he targets certain elements of this system, using his insider knowledge of its inner workings to his advantage. Sooner or later, Putin will have to react to this situation, and he has no good way out. He’s unlikely to risk punishing his loyal foot soldier, but he can’t go all the way to accommodate Kadyrov’s antics either. The president’s actions are being closely watched by the Russian elite, which is waiting for Putin to put Kadyrov in his place.
Turchak and his team
Former «United Russia» party Secretary General Andrey Turchak, who fell from grace with Putin and was sent to the remote Altai Republic as its head, has begun to assemble a team of politicians and managers close to him in the region. Dmitry Khubezov, a close associate of Turchak and former head of the State Duma’s Committee on Health Protection, became the region’s Minister of Health. Another long-time associate, Maksim Zhavoronkov, was put in charge of the republic’s government apparatus. Turchak had also planned to bring State Duma deputy Zurab Makiev with him to Altai, but the party’s federal leadership has decreed that the MP has to stay in Moscow for the time being. It is clear that, despite the partial disgrace, the ambitious politician would like to take his revenge and return to the federal level after some time — either as the head of a larger region or to an important post in the Russian parliament or government. Turchak’s «team-building» efforts in Altai can be seen as preparation for such a return. Turchak is not disbanding his team, far from it. He is even trying to retain people from outside his orbit (and quite successfully, as in the case of Dmitry Khubezov). Turchak’s entourage is voluntarily downshifting. According to the informal rules of the power vertical, the position of the head of a Duma committee is roughly equivalent to that of a federal minister in the same sphere. This was illustrated by the new appointments of the former heads of the energy and sports ministries, Nikolai Shulginov and Oleg Matitsyn, who moved on to chair their respective committees in the Lower House of the parliament. In this sense, the move of the former head of the Duma Committee on Health Protection to the post of a minister in a small and depressed region looks like a serious demotion. But the story has a twist to it: the move was entirely voluntary. This means that Turchak is still able to give his inner circle promises and inspire hope.
Having his own team is seen as an advantage in the power vertical, and may indeed help Turchak if he succeeds in regaining the president’s favor. Judging by the fact that Makiev is still stuck in Moscow, the head of Altai will face opposition from influential federal groups. The top of the power vertical is getting really crowded, the system is experiencing personnel stagnation and «bottlenecks», and in such circumstances prominent figures are trying to gain a foothold in their current jobs in order to have a springboard for career expansion in the future or at least to hold on to their current positions. An experienced, if disgraced, player and his team can only take someone’s place, and no one is in a hurry to give it up for their sake. It will be worth watching to see how Turchak continues to build the team.
