With tensions rising between the United States and Denmark (backed by the EU) over Greenland, Russia—one of the Arctic’s major players—seems to be reacting with a blend of quiet satisfaction and real strategic worry. From Moscow’s viewpoint, the dispute highlights unusual cracks among NATO allies while at the same time raising bigger questions about what security in the High North might look like going forward.
This article looks at how Moscow reads Washington’s renewed push on Greenland, including the signals about beefing up its presence there. It digs into how Russian political figures and experts view U.S. intentions—from stepped-up military and strategic involvement all the way to more extreme possibilities—and what all this means for Russia’s wider Arctic game plan.
Russia’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic, Relations with the United States and the European Union, and Greenland
Russia doesn’t have direct economic or security stakes in Greenland the way it does elsewhere in the Arctic, but the broader region has mattered strategically to Moscow since the Cold War. Back then—and still today—both U.S. and Russian navies have prized the North Pole as the shortest route for surface ships and nuclear subs. Militarily, launching missiles from the polar region cuts the distance to key targets. The Arctic also gives the shortest flight paths for bombers traveling between Russia and North America. Geographically, the polar route is the quickest line for Russian ICBMs and intercontinental bombers aimed at the U.S. On top of that, the Arctic Ocean connects the Atlantic and Pacific, and Russia keeps its main SSBN bases in the Kola Peninsula, home to its entire nuclear submarine fleet.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, government-linked think tanks and media have increasingly framed Greenland discussions around Indigenous rights and self-determination. That said, military worries haven’t gone away—especially about U.S. military facilities on the island and the threats they might pose to Russia.
It’s worth noting that Russian security services were already targeting Greenland and parts of the U.S. political scene well before 2022. Six years ago, a fake letter supposedly from Greenland’s foreign minister landed with a U.S. senator from Arkansas, floating the idea of the United States buying the island. Danish intelligence later confirmed it was a Russian forgery.
When Russian security and foreign-policy circles talk about what’s happening in Greenland now, they usually point to what they call «the growing militarization of the Arctic» and «confrontational policies» coming from NATO countries. At the same time, they make a point of highlighting local Greenlanders’ rights, insisting that many want independence from Denmark and have no interest in joining the United States.
Beyond the talking points, Moscow is clearly trying to take advantage of the friction between Washington and the EU over Greenland. Particularly after the August meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin in Anchorage, Russian policymakers have been hoping for some kind of deal with the U.S. on Ukraine—and then perhaps pulling Washington into economic projects in Russia’s own Arctic zones.
In that light, Russia’s official line on Greenland mixes security concerns with caution so as not to push Washington away. You can see Russian officials directing most of their criticism at EU and NATO Arctic policies rather than going straight after the United States.
A good way to track the shift is to compare what Russia’s ambassador to Denmark, Vladimir Barbin, said in early 2025 and then again in January 2026—the tone and focus clearly changed.
In early 2025, when Barbin addressed U.S. plans for Greenland, he warned that the trend toward Arctic militarization, NATO’s confrontational stance, and the opening of the region to foreign military forces were all undermining stability. He stressed that Greenland’s future «should be decided by the Greenlanders themselves, based on current legislation and without external interference,» and that «the Greenlanders’ choice must be respected.»
By January 2026, he was pointing the finger more at European countries. He noted that NATO military activity in the region keeps growing—at sea, on land, and in the air—”including the armed forces of Alliance states such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, which are far removed from the Arctic." He added that «Denmark is playing a proactive role in inviting NATO states to the Arctic,» noticeably leaving the United States out of the critique.
Commenting on the latest U.S. National Security Strategy, Barbin argued it basically revives the Monroe Doctrine, treating the Western Hemisphere (and by extension Greenland) as America’s backyard. That, he suggested, makes conflicts almost inevitable—between U.S. ambitions, Greenland’s push for independence, and Denmark’s claim to sovereignty.
Also in 2025, a joint Russian-Belarusian foreign ministry report included a chapter on human rights in Denmark, zeroing in on what it called «shortcomings in ensuring the rights of Greenland’s residents.»
Hopes for Re-engagement with Washington and Greenland
Still, Moscow is genuinely uneasy about growing U.S. military reach in Greenland. The upgrade of the U.S. space facility at Pituffik, for instance, drew sharp comments from Russian officials. Moscow responded by saying these new challenges «will certainly be taken into account in Russian military planning,» including «the feasibility of implementing additional military-technical response measures.»
Russia’s main security fears in the Arctic center on NATO’s expanding footprint and attempts to build an integrated military theater in the High North. Specifically on Greenland, Moscow worries that more U.S. rights to install infrastructure—missile defense, submarine tracking in the GIUK gap, and so on—would lock in long-term American access to resources, open another entry route into the Arctic, and bolster Washington’s position across the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, Russia keeps trying to exploit the strains between the U.S. and other NATO Arctic members, positioning itself as the voice of regional dialogue.
Russia as a Supporter of Regional Dialogue in the Arctic?
These days Russian officials argue that the Arctic Council could play a key role in keeping the region from becoming militarized. Yet they also say Copenhagen, as the current chair, doesn’t have the political will to deliver real progress on international cooperation through the Council.
Right now, the Arctic Council is pretty much the only multilateral channel Russia still has with NATO’s Arctic states—since Moscow pulled out of other Arctic cooperation formats (though the Council itself doesn’t handle military matters). The war in Ukraine badly damaged Russia’s ties with other Arctic countries across forums like the Arctic Council (AC), Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and Northern Dimension—all of which have been scaled back or frozen. Russia also canceled its agreements with the Nordic Council of Ministers (which includes Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden) to run information centers in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The invasion hit EU-Russia economic ties hard too.
In theory, with no other platforms available, the Arctic Council could become a place for military-related communication. But the structural and geopolitical barriers—many of them created by Russia’s own actions, especially the invasion of Ukraine—make that highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Moscow is worried that the United States might gain expanded rights to place more military infrastructure in Greenland, including missile defense and submarine-tracking systems in the GIUK gap. From Russia’s standpoint, that would guarantee long-term U.S. access to raw materials, open another Arctic entry point, and reinforce Washington’s strategic edge in the region.
At the same time, the war in Ukraine, the collapse in relations with the EU, and the lingering hope of cutting some kind of deal with Washington have left Moscow with limited room to maneuver. Those realities have kept Russian officials from taking too harsh a public line toward U.S. plans for Greenland—at least not openly. So, in the current U.S.-Denmark-EU disagreement over Greenland, Moscow looks uncertain about its next move and has mostly settled on a wait-and-see posture: trying to get the maximum strategic payoff from whatever happens rather than trying to steer events itself.
Please note that the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official stance of the College of Europe
