On Orthodox Christmas, Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church gave an interview to the state channel Rossiya 1. The holiday itself received scant attention—a perfunctory question from the journalist came only at the very end. The bulk of the conversation was devoted to ideological, political, and geopolitical themes. The head of the ROC reflected on how the West has «ganged up» against Russia because it offers «a highly attractive alternative model of civilizational development» and promotes values that Europe and America have supposedly abandoned.
The key concept in the patriarch’s remarks was «civilization.» He described morality, in particular, as a «condition for the survival» of civilization. This term has long been favored by Vladimir Putin; it is actively employed by Kremlin ideologists in the presidential administration’s political bloc and is enshrined in the current version of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, which defines the country as a «distinct state-civilization».
The notion is borrowed from historians and philosophers who developed the «civilizational approach» to history, including the ideas of Lev Gumilev, whom Putin loves to quote. According to this framework, world history is not a linear progression but a succession of civilizations, each passing through stages of rise, decline, and eventual demise. Putin views Russia as a young civilization capable of successfully resisting the «dying» West thanks to its «historical age»: «Russia has not yet reached its peak; we are on the march of development.»
Today, this concept and the entire civilizational approach are being aggressively imposed on Russians through ideological articles by administration staff and the propagandistic university course «Fundamentals of Russian Statehood.» Patriarch Kirill transplants them into ecclesiastical discourse, thereby making it an extension and integral part of the state’s narrative.
The most striking moment in the interview was the patriarch’s musings on «traitors to the Motherland”—his term for those who fall outside the «public consensus.» He warned such «traitors» of «legal consequences,» without specifying what those might be. Here, the patriarch stepped beyond the bounds of official state rhetoric, aligning himself with the most radical pro-regime deputies and activists. As a seasoned politician and media figure, Kirill knows precisely which formulations are guaranteed to make the news headlines. Most likely, with this provocative signal he is once again underscoring his loyalty to the Kremlin and the country’s top leadership. Vladimir Putin, with his background in the security services, is bound to appreciate such rhetoric.
The patriarch’s less sensational statements also have a clear addressee: the leaders of the Kremlin’s political bloc, which informally oversees the ROC. Echoing Alexander Kharichev, head of the administration’s department for social monitoring and analysis, Kirill reiterated theses about «self-sacrifice» and «heroic feat» as supposedly inherent to the Russian people. In his writings, Kharichev—drawing on pseudoscientific constructs that bear no relation to sociological data—claims that Russians adhere to collectivist values rather than individualism and are even prepared to give their lives for certain «higher goals»: «For us, it turns out, life is worth far less than for a Westerner. We believe there are things more important than mere existence.»
The patriarch speaks of «feat»: the word belongs to church discourse, but in Kirill’s rendering, the «feat» is not one of faith but of sacrifice to the state. It implies renouncing «comfort» and «self-centeredness.» «How can one defend the Motherland without a feat? How could we have built such a powerful country as ours without labor feats?» the patriarch asks rhetorically, adding that «without feat there can be no truly healthy civilizational development.» He lists «self-sacrifice» among the foundations of a strong marriage (family and demography being top priorities for Putin and the Kremlin) and, of course, in the context of the war.
Thus, in a flagship interview timed for one of the two main Orthodox holidays, Kirill performed not as a religious leader but as a state manager in charge of one area of ideological work. Responding to what were evidently pre-arranged questions, he presented a version of the state ideology promoted by the Kremlin’s political bloc, adapted for an Orthodox audience. We can fully expect such speeches to soon resound from pulpits—delivered by bishops and clergy loyal to the ROC leadership.
Notably, the patriarch offers no original ideological interpretations of his own; he follows the line of «works» by administration staff and developers of the «Fundamentals of Russian Statehood» course. For this reason, unlike Sergei Kiriyenko’s associates Alexander Kharichev or Andrey Polosin (the course’s architect), Kirill cannot even be called a proto-ideologue—he is precisely a manager.
The Christmas interview demonstrates that the patriarch has fully integrated into the state hierarchy, where one must regularly prove loyalty to the president, articulate ideas «close to his heart» and provide the head of state with leisure activities. This is how Kremlin, government, and regional officials behave. The patriarch now does the same. At the same time, he emphasizes subordination, sending signals of loyalty not only to Vladimir Putin but also to the political bloc officials who curate the ROC.
For many years, the church leadership retained a degree of independence—including on ideological matters. Oversight from the presidential administration was largely ritualistic, limited to coordinating interactions between the Kremlin and the ROC. The patriarch’s recent statements indicate that this autonomy has been lost: the church has entered the boundaries of Sergei Kiriyenko’s «greater political bloc» alongside the «external circuit,» higher education, and culture.
Christmas Among the Military
Like a bureaucratic opportunist, Patriarch Kirill is moving in the right direction. Vladimir Putin marked his third consecutive Christmas in surroundings connected, one way or another, to the war. This year, he attended a service in a church reported by media to be located on the grounds of a GRU unit, alongside officers from that division. Whereas in previous years the president refrained from clearly formulated public statements at this time, on 6 January 2026 he could not hold back: «We very often call the Lord Saviour because He came to earth to save all people. And our warriors, Russia’s warriors, as if on the Lord’s commission, carry out this very mission—defending the Fatherland, saving the Motherland and its people. What I have said applies not only to those standing here but to all Russia’s warriors. Together with us, our brothers and representatives of other confessions share this joy, just as we rejoice with them when they celebrate their holidays.»
Unlike the patriarch, who did not venture to modify the Kremlin ideologists’ theses, the Russian president boldly intervenes in religious dogma, blending teachings on faith with state patriotism. Putin openly asserts that divisions between churches and religious denominations are formal: «If God exists, He does not know that people on earth have divided into different churches. We have common values—that is what matters, that is what unites us. Traditional common values among all the peoples of the Russian Federation.»
In Putin’s worldview, the state stands above religion, and the role of confessions is reduced to serving that state. The Russian president increasingly voices these views—which are heretical from the perspective of any faith—positioning himself as a preacher. And Patriarch Kirill is ready to echo him.
