With the onset of winter, Moscow is flexing its energy muscles to score points in Georgia’s Abkhazia and Moldova’s Transnistrian region. It is difficult to exaggerate the dependence of these two separatist regions on Russian energy supplies. The Transnistrian energy region is almost exclusively dependent on the import of Russian natural gas transported via Ukraine. Abkhazia’s reliance on Moscow, meanwhile, is also delicate due to the supply of Russian electricity, without which the Georgian breakaway region cannot provide sufficient thermal energy during the heating season. The common point between the two is that the supply of gas and electricity is subsidized by Russian state-owned companies. As a result, Russia can impose wider political conditions both on the separatist regions, as well as their parent states, Moldova and Georgia, who also need natural gas.
The ‘matryoshka’ principle of Moldova’s energy dependence on Russia
Following the 2021−2022 energy crisis (Riddle, October 2021), triggered by Russian manipulation of gas supplies, Moldova invested in gas diversification, which reduced the possibility of Gazprom to weaponize gas supply. However, this is only half true, because the country also needs cheap energy produced in the Transnistrian region, at the Kuchurgan Power Plant, for which Russian natural gas is essential.
After the threat from Russia was massively used to mobilize votes for the re-election of Maia Sandu in the presidential race in October-November 2024, the government in Chisinau is forced to resume official dialogue with Gazprom to avoid an energy crisis in the Transnistrian region. Although about 1.5 billion m3 of natural gas is annually purchased from non-Russian sources for the needs of the territory controlled by Chisinau, Russian natural gas continues to be supplied to the breakaway region. The Kuchurgan power plant in the Transnistrian region can generate about 80% of the electricity used to power households in the rest of Moldova by importing Russian gas. The rest of the electricity is produced within Moldova (excluding the breakaway region) or purchased from Romania. Any disruption to the electricity production process in the uncontrolled territory of Chisinau may affect the energy security of Moldova as a whole. For this reason, the non-renewal of the transit contract between Ukraine and Russia, which expires at the end of December 2024, is a cause for concern for the Moldovan authorities
The dependence of the Transnistrian region on Russia occurs in a context where Moldova has accumulated historic debts with Gazprom, exceeding $ 709 million, for the period 1991 to October 2021. According to an audit not acknowledged by the Russian side, Chisinau agrees to pay only $ 8,6 million. To ensure gas supplies to the separatist region, Chisinau intends to retain the gas contract from October 2021. Signed by representatives of the PAS-Maia Sandu government in October 2021, the contract today serves only for the purchase of gas for the Transnistrian region. After Russia occupied the Ukrainian territory where the Sokhranivka gas entry point is located in May 2022, as part of the full-scale aggression, Kyiv halted the gas transit to European customers, including to Moldova, because it was unable to take responsibility for the gas shipment. As a result, gas supplies to Moldova were reduced in volume by 30% after the summer of 2022 (to just 5.7 million cubic meters per day), leading to a deficit that also affected the Transnistrian region. Initially, the 2021 contract provided for the shipment of 3.3 billion cubic meters to both banks of the Dniester River (the entire country). To ensure energy production in the breakaway region, from where Moldova buys cheap electricity, Chisinau decided to direct all Russian gas to the Transnistrian region. On the other hand, Moldova started buying gas from EU traders at prices ranging from € 1,400 to up to € 1,900 per 1,000 m3, mainly because Russian gas was weaponized, including through the explosion of Nord Stream 1 and 2. High gas prices triggered an energy crisis in Moldova, with serious socio-economic consequences due to 30% inflation in December 2022. Concomitantly, the Moldovan authorities continued to purchase Russian gas for the Transnistria region, while for the territory under Chisinau control, gas is purchased from Europe at market prices. This was also facilitated by how Moldova developed alternative supply routes, such as the reverse flow through the Balkans, which allows it to import gas via the Southern Gas Corridor. The resumption of Russian gas supplies to the entire country is considered a «political taboo». In theory, this is possible despite the events in Ukraine, because Russia could sell gas via the «Turkish Stream», as it does with Hungary.
In reality, both the economy and the population of Moldova need energy at the most affordable price. With Russian gas, the Kuchurgan power plant can produce cheap electricity, which is then sold to Chisinau at a price of $ 66 per MWh. The electricity arrangement between Chisinau and Tiraspol is extended annually. In mid-November, the price offered in the Transnistria region was about five times lower than that of electricity commercialized in Romania. The price offered by power generating companies in the breakaway region has always been competitive due to subsidized Russian gas, with the exception of Ukraine, which was also able to produce cheaper electricity that it sold to Moldova before the large-scale Russian military aggression in 2022.
In order for the breakaway region to be able to supply cheap electricity to the rest of Moldova, Chisinau must find alternative solutions for transport. During the meeting of Moldovan Energy Minister Viktor Parlikov with Alexei Miller, CEO of Gazprom, in late November, the Russian side linked the continuation of supplies to the breakaway region (5.7 million cubic meters per day) to the payment of a debt of $ 709 million by Chisinau. Perhaps Moscow also believes that Chisinau could use its strategic ties with Kiev to obtain permission to buy gas for the Transnistria region on the Russian border. In any case, if transit through Ukraine disappears, gas supplies could be made via the Turkish route («Turkish Stream»). Regardless of which option is chosen, the transport costs would have to be borne by the Moldovan side, the separatist regime in Tiraspol or Moscow.
Abkhazia’s electricity stability in Russia’s hands
Abkhazia’s current energy difficulties are in the spotlight against the backdrop of Moscow’s attempts of further «Russification» of the region. The opposition reacted by storming the legislative branch of the region, which was seeking to ratify an investment deal with Moscow that would allow the sale of land and other types of privatization operations, with the participation of Russian companies. Thus, the local ruling elite was prevented from validating an investment agreement to attract financial resources from Russia to cover the budget deficit of the breakaway region. The protests have unveiled the fragility of Russian influence and the non-compliance with the 2008 and 2014 agreements to take part in the «harmonization» with Russia, including the Eurasian Economic Union. Although it resists full integration, the breakaway region is increasingly turning to Russia in the energy sector.
Without free electricity supplies from Russia, Abkhazia cannot survive the winter, especially since it has an underdeveloped thermal power system. The energy shortage in the region became more acute after 2020 due to cryptocurrency mining and, subsequently, droughts that exhausted the generating capacity of the Enguri hydroelectric power station. The energy produced at the hydroelectric power station has been shared between Sukhumi and Tbilisi on the principle that 60% is kept by Abkhazia, which controls the operational part of the plant, and 40% is given to the rest of Georgia, where the dam is located. The lack of energy resources in Abkhazia forced Georgia to give up its share in the energy production of the hydroelectric power station. This is partly how Georgia is trying to prevent an energy collapse in the breakaway region, which is also sinking even deeper into its electricity dependence on Russia.
Abkhazia’s energy insecurity does not affect the rest of Georgia, which is able to produce enough energy for domestic consumption and even has future plans to export energy to Turkey and even Russia. In 2023, Georgia earned more than $ 100 million in revenues from electricity exports, 91% of which went to Turkey. Abkhazia’s inability to manage its energy sector increases its demand for Russian gas, something Moscow must take into account to prevent Abkhazia from asking self-sufficient Georgia for help. Every year, Russia supplies electricity as humanitarian aid («социальный переток») to Abkhazia. Of the 2.2−2.6 billion kWh consumed annually by the breakaway region in 2023−2024, about 300 million kWh will be received from Russia free of charge. In addition to subsidized electricity, the Russian company Inter RAO sells electricity to Abkhazia at a price of 4 rubles ($ 0.03) per 1 kWh, which the population buys at 2 rubles ($ 0.01) per kWh. The price of residential electricity in Russia is 5 rubles ($ 0.05) per 1 kWh, while in Georgia it is 0.07 euros per 1 kWh. The availability of cheap or free electricity is one of the key ways Russia can offset the reputational costs of its mishandled attempts to gain control of Abkhazian property and land. The plans to build a gas pipeline to Abkhazia will allow Moscow to diversify Abkhazia’s energy dependence on Russian energy supplies, putting the Georgia’s breakaway region on a par with Moldova’s.
The integration of Moldova and Georgia into regional gas connection routes via Romania and Azerbaijan, respectively, freed them from Russia’s ability to use its dominant position on the gas market to strengthen its influence. Unlike their «parent states,» the breakaway regions are still heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. This energy dependence has consequences for everyone, including Russia. Transnistria’s dependence on free Russian gas is a serious headache for Chisinau. An energy crisis in the breakaway region not only entails economic costs, but also a potential humanitarian crisis affecting up to 350,000 inhabitants of the region and the loss of power of the pro-EU parliamentary majority in the post-2025 election cycle, the isolation and possible dismissal of President Maia Sandu by future governing coalitions. If the Transnistrian region collapses due to gas shortages, an inflationary crisis will surely affect the whole of Moldova, making the pro-Russian forces’ argument about restoring direct gas negotiations with Moscow more attractive to voters. If Abkhazia falls into Russia’s energy trap and accumulates debts as Transnistria did, the privatization of the region’s property, now rejected by the Abkhaz opposition, will be inevitable, decreasing any future prospects, even hypothetical, of reintegration into Georgia.
In both cases, Moscow faces dilemmas over whether to cover the rising energy costs of its subsidies to the Transnistrian and Abkhazian regions, incentivizing unsustainable businesses such as cryptocurrency mining, mismanagement of energy infrastructure, and local corruption schemes. Before any scenario of reintegration with the «parent states,» the two separatist regions are likely to experience serious energy crises, starting with the Transnistrian region. Moscow is likely to maintain the two separatist regimes to use as leverage against Moldova and, to a lesser extent, Georgia. With its influence in the «near abroad» declining, every piece of its geopolitical presence is highly valuable to Russia.
