In early 2022, amid the growing threat of full-scale war in Europe, the United States began developing legislative measures to expedite and increase military aid to Ukraine. One of the key initiatives was the revival of the Lend-Lease program, a World War II mechanism that supported allies. The Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, passed in 2022, was intended to simplify and accelerate weapons deliveries by bypassing bureaucratic obstacles. However, the political priorities of the U.S. administration resulted in the unrealized potential of Lend-Lease. This article examines the history of the law’s adoption, its intended mechanism, the positions of the U.S. and Ukraine, and the reasons it was never implemented in practice.
History of the Law’s Adoption
On January 19, Republican Senator John Cornyn introduced a bill to revive Lend-Lease in the U.S. Senate, arguing it was necessary to eliminate bureaucratic barriers and urgently provide Ukraine with weapons to counter Russian aggression. On March 8, 2022, an article on the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) website compared Ukraine to 1941 Britain, asserting that supporting Kyiv was a matter of U.S. security, as a Ukrainian defeat would undermine trust in America in Europe and Asia.
Influenced by these arguments and reports of mass civilian killings in Bucha, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved the «Lend-Lease for Ukraine» bill on April 6, 2022. On April 28, the House of Representatives supported it with 417 votes in favor and 10 against. The next day, Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked Congress, calling Lend-Lease a tool for victory over the «heirs of Nazism.» However, on May 3, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the U.S., Oksana Markarova, clarified that Lend-Lease was a reserve mechanism for emergency support.
President Joe Biden signed the bill into law on May 9, 11 days after it was legally possible. The date, coinciding with Victory Day over Nazism, was deliberately chosen to counter Russian propaganda. However, this delay during an acute phase of hostilities raises questions: if the law was meant to accelerate aid, why postpone its activation for a symbolic gesture?
Despite the delay, the signing was a powerful symbolic act, both a foreign policy statement and a historical allusion to the «arsenal of democracy.» Biden stated that yielding to aggression would cost more than fighting for freedom. Zelenskyy called it a «historic step,» confident that Ukraine and the U.S. would triumph together, as they did 77 years ago. Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov drew a direct parallel between Zelenskyy and Churchill, noting that in 1941, Churchill convinced the U.S. to fight Nazism, and now Zelenskyy was doing the same against «Rashism.»
How Was the Law Supposed to Work?
The essence of the «Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022» was to grant the U.S. President expanded authority to temporarily transfer defense equipment to Ukraine and other Eastern European countries to counter Russian aggression. The law allowed faster and simpler provision of equipment without bureaucratic delays or immediate financial obligations, with Ukraine potentially responsible for repayment or reimbursement in the future. The President was required to establish accelerated delivery procedures by July 8, 2022, but this did not happen.
On July 13, the White House explained to Voice of America that priority was given to a $ 40 billion grant aid package approved by Congress, which needed to be utilized by September. Lend-Lease, with its potential future compensation, was deemed less attractive amid urgent and large-scale support for Ukraine. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba confirmed on July 18 that the U.S. prioritized the $ 40 billion package, with Lend-Lease as a supplementary tool. Some Ukrainian experts, like political scientist Oleksandr Kraev, claimed on July 16 that Lend-Lease would only activate after other aid programs were exhausted, which the law’s text does not support.
In May-July 2022, Russia advanced in eastern Ukraine, capturing Popasna and Severodonetsk and completing the siege of Azovstal in Mariupol. If the Zelenskyy administration was wary of Lend-Lease due to debt concerns, payment and return terms were to be regulated by subsequent agreements, which were never concluded. Moreover, prioritizing postwar financial concerns over immediate military needs during a survival war seems questionable.
By July 2022, Lend-Lease implementation was not finalized. Nevertheless, let’s examine the law’s potential advantages compared to existing U.S. aid programs.
How Could Lend-Lease Have Worked?
The report we are looking at for this analysis draws on official data on U.S. military aid to Ukraine from February 2022 to July 2023, during the Lend-Lease period (excluding August-September 2023). Despite Congress approving approximately $ 49 billion, only $ 17 billion in aid reached Ukraine during this time.
Existing aid mechanisms—Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)—have limitations. PDA allows direct transfers from U.S. military stocks but requires adherence to Congressional budget limits and separate approvals for equipment lists and costs. USAI involves contracts with U.S. manufacturers to produce weapons for Ukraine, which can take months or years. FMF provides grants and loans for Ukraine to purchase U.S. weapons, but procurement processes are time-consuming.
While PDA and Lend-Lease both involve transfers from U.S. stocks, Lend-Lease granted the President near-unlimited authority to transfer equipment without Congressional approvals or immediate budget expenditures, as items would be loaned or leased with deferred compensation. Lend-Lease also mandated accelerated delivery mechanisms, unlike PDA’s multi-step procedures that caused delays.
Examples of delays highlight the issue: NASAMS systems promised in July 2022 arrived in November 2022, and M1 Abrams tanks announced in January 2023 arrived in September 2023. Of $ 18.6 billion allocated for USAI in 2022−2023, only $ 950 million (5%) was delivered to Ukraine. Through PDA, only $ 6.4 billion of $ 11 billion was used in 2022, with $ 4.6 billion lost due to the fiscal year’s end.
In contrast, Lend-Lease could have enabled rapid transfers of existing U.S. weapons like NASAMS, Abrams tanks, and GMLRS rockets within weeks, avoiding production delays, budget cycle constraints, and ensuring timely delivery of critical aid.
Lend-Lease as a Backup: Ukraine’s Position
On September 10, Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov acknowledged that a decision to launch Lend-Lease had been made with funding allocated, but details were still under discussion. On September 29, Ambassador Oksana Markarova emphasized that Lend-Lease was a reserve mechanism in case Congressional funding ceased, as it involved leasing or payment, unlike free aid programs.
On October 1, 2022, Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk claimed the U.S. Lend-Lease law had «entered into force,» though it had been effective since May 9, 2022. He likely referred to the new U.S. fiscal year, but this was inaccurate, as the law applied to 2022−2023 and was meant for immediate aid acceleration. His statement reflects limited awareness among Ukrainian officials and public discourse about Lend-Lease’s mechanisms. On December 19, 2022, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko stated that Lend-Lease was limited by Ukraine’s financial capacity, making other aid channels preferable.
Ukraine’s leadership position is unclear. The law did not automatically require Ukraine to pay full costs, as this was to be settled in later agreements that never materialized. Prioritizing free aid over Lend-Lease is also puzzling, as repayment discussions would occur post-war. Seven months after the law’s signing, the U.S. took no concrete steps to implement it, and Ukraine showed little interest.
2023: What’s Dead Cannot Die
In January-February 2023, Ukrainian officials emphasized prioritizing U.S. grant programs, viewing Lend-Lease as a backup. Oleksiy Arestovych noted its financial drawbacks due to repayment obligations, while Andriy Yermak highlighted the economic benefits of free aid, and Mykhailo Podolyak claimed Ukraine was receiving all necessary aid promptly. However, on February 24, 2023, Zelenskyy mentioned Lend-Lease among Ukraine’s achievements in the war’s first year.
On April 10, 2023, POLITICO reported that the Biden administration still hadn’t used Lend-Lease. White House officials called it a reserve option for potential political shifts, like reduced Congressional support. Some lawmakers, including Senator Cornyn, criticized the administration’s inaction as absurd, especially amid dwindling U.S. weapons stocks.
On July 26, 2023, Ambassador Markarova told Radio Free Europe that the Lend-Lease law was nearing its September expiration, and Ukraine was working to extend it. She stressed its importance as a backup amid potential budget delays. On October 1, 2023, the law’s aid period expired without renewal. A BBC report on October 5, citing White House sources, suggested the administration preferred distributing financial aid over direct weapons transfers, allowing flexibility in procurement decisions. While understandable, this approach caused significant delivery delays with critical wartime consequences.
In Ukraine, former Putin advisor turned U.S. publicist Andrey Illarionov and Ukrainian-American publicist Serhiy Lyubarsky led systemic criticism of Washington’s Lend-Lease inaction. Since summer 2022, they and diaspora activists protested at the White House, claiming the Biden administration deliberately «froze» the mechanism, undermining rapid weapons deliveries. They also accused Ambassador Markarova of «sabotaging» the issue. Markarova called these attacks «marginal» and part of «Russian disinformation,» emphasizing that her team focused on grant aid, not Lend-Lease disputes.
What’s Next?
Post-expiration, efforts to revive Lend-Lease persisted. In April 2024, Republican Senators John Cornyn, Jeanne Shaheen, Tim Scott, and Chris Coons proposed extending it to 2026, but it wasn’t passed. In December 2024, Congress approved the 2025 defense budget without Lend-Lease provisions, despite Ukrainian diplomatic efforts.
On April 14, 2025, Representatives Gregory Meeks and Steny Hoyer introduced a comprehensive bill in the House, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine, with provisions to extend Lend-Lease from fiscal 2023 to 2028. This was part of a broader initiative to pressure Russia and expand Ukraine’s support. No information on the bill’s status is currently available.
Conclusion
The Lend-Lease law was a significant symbolic step, underscoring U.S. political support for Ukraine and historical parallels to World War II. However, the Biden administration appeared uninterested in using it for rapid, large-scale weapons deliveries, opting instead for PDA, USAI, and FMF programs. These provided regular aid but lacked the speed and scale for Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia or gain a strategic advantage. U.S. policy seemed based on «managed restraint,» sufficient to prevent Ukraine’s defeat but not enough for total victory, likely to avoid escalation or provoke Russia into radical actions, including nuclear threats. Lend-Lease remained a reserve card, never played in actual policy.
Ukraine’s stance was ambivalent: Kyiv welcomed Lend-Lease but didn’t advocate for its use, framing it as a backup. In 2022−2023, Ukrainian leadership likely hoped U.S. aid through other channels would suffice, but this proved inadequate, contributing to heavy Ukrainian military losses in 2024−2025.
