Over the past decade, Sergei Kiriyenko’s political team in the Presidential Administration has replaced roughly 90% of Russia’s governors. The new regional heads have all gone through mandatory candidate training courses at RANEPA, learned to speak the same language as the political bloc, and adopted uniform practices. This standardization has proven highly useful to the Kremlin amid the full-scale war.
At the same time, Kiriyenko has stuck to his longstanding preference for a predominantly technocratic approach to forming the gubernatorial corps—genuine military figures have yet to appear in significant numbers. Meanwhile, a process of cadre consolidation is now under way: governors from the first «Kiriyenko wave» are either already serving or about to begin second terms, and the average age of incumbent regional heads continues to creep upward.
The Standardization Operation
Soon after the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, senior Russian leadership seriously discussed abolishing direct elections for governors. In wartime conditions the move looked entirely logical, but it met resistance. Candidate selection for regional heads, management of their election campaigns, and ongoing oversight of their performance remain core functions of the political bloc. Scrapping elections would have sharply reduced the operational scope of Kiriyenko’s team. In 2022, however—at a moment when he had not yet fully expanded his influence—Kiriyenko succeeded in persuading the country’s top leadership to preserve gubernatorial elections and, with them, the political bloc’s authority.
From the outset of his work in the Kremlin, Kiriyenko made standardization of the gubernatorial corps one of his top priorities. Since the early 2000s regional leaders had been tightly integrated into the power vertical and demonstrated loyalty to the federal center. Yet even in the mid-2010s, Russia’s regional leadership remained a motley collection of figures with highly diverse backgrounds: «Varangians» (outsiders) alongside local cadres, technocrats next to public politicians, young appointees sharing space with veteran bureaucrats. This diversity stemmed from the fact that gubernatorial appointments depended heavily on lobbying strength of various federal and regional influence groups, as well as on whatever stylistic «fashion» prevailed inside the Kremlin at the time. During Vyacheslav Volodin’s period of political oversight, for instance, the trend was to appoint mayors of major cities as governors (Chelyabinsk Region went to Chelyabinsk mayor Mikhail Yurevich; Volgograd Region to Astrakhan mayor Sergei Bozhenov).
Kiriyenko, a firm believer in corporate discipline and clear KPIs, quickly set about imposing formal order on the chaos. His political bloc’s first high-profile project was the promotion of «young technocrats» into the gubernatorial corps. From 2017 onward, regional heads were increasingly drawn from federal ministries and agencies—usually at deputy-minister level—with the implicit promise of an eventual return to Moscow in higher posts. The «young technocrats» label was stretched to cover not-so-young figures, quite public politicians with experience of competitive campaigns (former Samara mayor Dmitry Azarov or Sverdlovsk Fair Russia leader Alexander Burkov), and even representatives of the security services. The branding worked: Azarov and Burkov, with their neat haircuts and business-like appearance, visually blended into the lineup of technocratic deputy ministers.
Genuine standardization, however, took place on another level—through the candidate training courses for regional leaders at RANEPA, colorfully dubbed the «governors’ school.» There, people from the most varied backgrounds were taught modern management techniques, public behavior skills, and media handling. «Students» took part in business simulations and team-building exercises—throwing themselves under armored vehicles or jumping off cliffs, for example. As a result, graduates acquired a shared line in their biographies, internalized the political bloc’s requirements, and learned to react to routine and crisis situations in roughly the same, predictable ways. Almost all of today’s governors—72 out of 83—were appointed during the period when Kiriyenko has headed the Presidential Administration’s political bloc. Roughly 60 of those 72 passed through the governors’ school.
After the start of the full-scale war, standardization of the gubernatorial corps continued. Eight regional heads were replaced in 2022, four in 2023, eight again in 2024, and another eight in 2025. The last representatives of the «old guard» fell under rotation: Vasily Golubev in Rostov Region, Oleg Kuvshinnikov in Vologda, Evgeny Kuyvashev in Sverdlovsk, Roman Kopin in Chukotka. The Kremlin also removed several underperforming leaders appointed shortly before Kiriyenko’s arrival: in 2022, Igor Vasiliev (Kirov Region) and Sergei Zhvachkin (Tomsk Region) left their posts. A separate category includes political experiments from previous years: Vladimir Sipyagin in Vladimir Region (LDPR representative who rose on the 2018 protest vote wave) and Alexei Ostrovsky in Smolensk (also LDPR but already coordinated with the authorities under the «Crimean consensus» era of Volodin). Both eventually resigned.
The remaining 11 governors appointed before Kiriyenko’s arrival fall into two clear groups.
The first comprises heads of large, strategically important regions: Sergei Sobyanin in Moscow, Andrei Vorobyov in Moscow Region, Alexander Drozdenko in Leningrad Region, Rustam Minnikhanov in Tatarstan, Veniamin Kondratyev in Krasnodar Territory, Vladimir Vladimirov in Stavropol Territory. These are either high-profile federal-level figures and representatives of powerful clans (Sobyanin, Vorobyov), consensus figures for local elites (Minnikhanov), or figures acceptable to key federal influence groups (Kondratyev, Vladimirov, Drozdenko). Replacing any of them requires serious lobbying and top-level agreements (while plenty of aspirants eye such attractive positions, of course).
The second group covers problematic, depressed regions: Andrei Bocharov in Volgograd Region, Sergei Sitnikov in Kostroma, Alexander Bogomaz in Bryansk. Here the dynamic is reversed: young, ambitious cadres show little interest in such regions, understanding perfectly that even with good fortune a successful career trajectory is unlikely. Hence the «old-timers» remain.
Standing apart is Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya. He maintains direct contact with Vladimir Putin and serves the president as guarantor of stability in the republic.
As for dismissals of governors already appointed under Kiriyenko, they usually stem from two causes. Either the individual failed to fit the prevailing «technocratic» template of recent years (former Omsk governor Alexander Burkov and ex-Krasnoyarsk head Alexander Uss), or the resignation was tied to criminal proceedings against the leader and/or his entourage (as with Maxim Egorov in Tambov Region and Alexei Smirnov in Kursk).
Technocrats in Wolf’s Clothing
Since the Volodin era, the Presidential Administration’s political bloc has consistently tailored gubernatorial appointments to the current political conjuncture—or, more precisely, to Vladimir Putin’s tastes. In the early 2010s the president’s favorite project was the All-Russian Popular Front (ONF). That is why, in 2013, Volgograd Region went to ONF executive committee head Andrei Bocharov. A former paratrooper and Hero of Russia, he was positioned as a «man of the people.» Yet Bocharov had long been firmly embedded in the system: since 2005 he had served as Bryansk Region vice-governor, sat in the State Duma for United Russia, and acted as federal inspector for Bryansk. Volodin’s political bloc reported to the president on the promotion of «popular front» figures while ensuring no genuine outsider without vertical experience entered the system.
Kiriyenko adopted a similar tactic after the full-scale war began. Putin was absorbed by the themes of the invasion itself and the development of the «new territories.» To administer the occupied Ukrainian regions, the Presidential Administration actively recruited «rotational» officials, motivating them with promises of career advancement. To reinforce that motivation and demonstrate to the president progress in promoting «military» cadres, the political bloc in 2023 advanced Vitaly Khotsenko (Omsk Region) and Vladislav Kuznetsov (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug). Before their appointments, the first had been chairman of the so-called DPR government, the second deputy chairman of the so-called LPR government. Notably, both had already been in the Kremlin’s personnel reserve before the war and had attended the governors’ school. Kuznetsov, until 2022, had been eyeing the far more attractive Orenburg Region rather than remote, sparsely populated Chukotka.
In 2025 Irina Geht joined the same cohort by heading Nenets Autonomous Okrug. She had previously led the government of occupied Zaporizhzhia Region but possessed solid system credentials, having served as Chelyabinsk Region vice-governor and senator from that region.
That same year, 2025, the gubernatorial corps saw its first participant in the full-scale invasion—a graduate of the Kremlin’s «Time of Heroes» program, Evgeny Pervyshov. He took over Tambov Region. Pro-Kremlin media emphasized precisely his «front-line» credentials in the appointment. Yet Pervyshov is no «trench man”—he is the former mayor of Krasnodar.
In the end, appointments of people connected in one way or another with the war have not become a mass phenomenon within the gubernatorial corps. All such «military» politicians were already tightly integrated into the system before their promotions, holding noticeable posts or sitting in the personnel reserve. The Kremlin continues to favor vetted, predictable cadres—even when it advances a «military» agenda.
New Trends, New Donors
The Presidential Administration’s political bloc draws its main personnel reserve for gubernatorial appointments from traditional sources: federal agencies and state corporations, promising managers in regional teams, and occasionally State Duma deputies. Yet the composition of these «donors» has noticeably shifted. In the late 2010s the chief suppliers were the Ministries of Economic Development and Industry and Trade. The political bloc recruited ambitious deputy ministers, offering them governorships with prospects of further advancement. As a result of federal-level cadre stagnation, many had to stay for second terms in the regions—Gleb Nikitin in Nizhny Novgorod, Stanislav Voskresensky in Ivanovo, Alexander Tsybulsky in Arkhangelsk. Today the Ministry of Economic Development has lost its status as key donor, while Industry and Trade supplies cadres mainly to its anchor regions (for example, Kaliningrad). By contrast, the Federal Antimonopoly Service has grown markedly stronger: during the war years two of its representatives became governors, in addition to pre-war appointee Dmitry Makhonin in Perm Territory. Mikhail Evraev took Yaroslavl Region, Vitaly Korelev—Tver Region.
Another active player in the gubernatorial field is Kiriyenko’s own team. Before the war three people closely tied to it became regional heads: longtime Kiriyenko associate from Nizhny Novgorod Valery Limarenko (Sakhalin Region), and former mayors of closed «Rosatom» cities Vladislav Shapsha (Kaluga Region) and Vyacheslav Gladkov (Belgorod Region). In 2023 gubernatorial posts went directly to Presidential Administration political bloc staffers: Alexander Sokolov (Kirov Region) and Vladimir Mazur (Tomsk Region). Previous political overseers—Vladislav Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin—never played the gubernatorial market so actively.
Another emerging trend is the growing practice of succession within regions. Previously, the right to appoint a successor was granted only to those regional heads who were moving to highly influential federal positions: Sergei Sobyanin after leaving Tyumen Oblast for the Presidential Administration, and former Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Alexander Khloponin upon becoming a deputy prime minister. These cases merely underscored the general rule: succession arrangements worked only when the leader of a large, wealthy region was promoted upward. Since the onset of full-scale war, however, what was once an exception has become the new norm.
Successors were left in place by Alexei Dyumin (Tula Oblast, now an aide to Putin), Sergei Tsivilev (Kemerovo Oblast, now Minister of Energy), and Roman Starovoyt (Kursk Oblast, former Minister of Transport). Similar authority was extended to Andrei Nikitin, who moved from Novgorod Oblast to the post of Minister of Transport, and Rostislav Goldstein, who traded the Jewish Autonomous Oblast for the Komi Republic. In each case, the designated successor came from the departing governor’s own team—moreover, from among local cadres, something that used to be highly unusual for regional appointments.
The emergence of new «donor» regions and the spread of internal succession point to deeper problems: a shortage of competent candidates for governorships and an overall devaluation of the position itself. Regional budgets are increasingly cash-strapped, economic difficulties are mounting, and the number of criminal cases against regional officials continues to rise. As a result, employees of influential federal agencies prefer to cling to their current posts. For officials from less prestigious structures such as the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), a governorship can still represent a meaningful step up the career ladder. The same logic applies to successors: departing governors are compelled to choose replacements from within their own teams, thereby giving local managers promotions that would previously have been out of reach.
Conservation of the cadre pool
The average age of Russian governors today stands at 52.6 years. For Russia’s generally aging elite, this remains relatively young. Yet over the past four years the regional leadership corps has noticeably aged: in 2022 the average was 51. The main reason is that the so-called «young technocrats» dispatched to the regions almost a decade ago are not receiving federal-level promotions, remain stuck in place, and naturally grow older. Only those governors with solid connections at the very top manage to move upward. Examples include former Putin bodyguard Alexei Dyumin, who transitioned from Tula Oblast to an aide position in the Kremlin, and Sergei Tsivilev, husband of the president’s niece, who moved from Kemerovo Oblast to head the Ministry of Energy.
Promotions have also gone to governors linked to the Rotenberg brothers’ circle: former Khabarovsk Krai head Mikhail Degtyarev (now Minister of Sport), the late former Transport Minister Roman Starovoyt, and his successor Andrei Nikitin. For governors lacking such reliable high-level patronage, the path to federal advancement remains blocked.
In the coming years the gubernatorial corps is likely to remain largely frozen in place. Within Putin’s vertical power structure, it is extremely difficult to leave a post voluntarily while preserving realistic career prospects. Therefore, the current cohort of governors—those appointed during the Kiriyenko era—will, despite mounting economic pressures, continue to sit tight in their regions. The main exceptions will be leaders who attract scrutiny from the security services. Thus, shortly before criminal cases were opened, former Kursk Oblast head Alexei Smirnov and ex-Tambov Oblast Governor Maxim Egorov both left their posts.
Another vulnerable group comprises the flamboyant appointees of the latest wave, such as Georgy Filimonov in Vologda Oblast and Vyacheslav Fedorishchev in Samara Oblast. Their populist experiments and the accompanying scandals irritate both local residents and regional elites, generating additional friction.
Finally, even the remaining long-serving «veterans”—with the notable exception of heavyweights such as Mintimer Shaimiev’s successor Rustam Minnikhanov and Ramzan Kadyrov—appear as potential candidates for replacement.
The standardization of the gubernatorial corps has bolstered the image of the Presidential Administration’s political bloc in Vladimir Putin’s eyes. Governors who speak the same language as Kiriyenko’s team now routinely display symbols of the «special military operation» on regional administration buildings, wear «Z» badges on their lapels, take on patronage responsibilities for settlements in the occupied territories, and compete vigorously in recruiting contract soldiers and providing war-related payments. This homogenized body of regional leaders faithfully executes any directive from above without allowing independent interpretations.
As long as Putin’s regime does not face serious social discontent, this standardization works to its advantage: regional heads effectively service the war machine. But should federal leadership’s popularity decline and protest activity begin to rise, these governors—accustomed to orienting themselves exclusively toward top-down orders—are unlikely to serve as effective intermediaries between the authorities and society.
