Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the world has repeatedly teetered on the brink of a highly dangerous escalation, one that could potentially involve the use of nuclear weapons. The primary factor preventing this scenario from unfolding has been the preservation of direct communication channels between Moscow and Washington. Additionally, unspoken self-restraints on both sides have played a moderating role. During 2021−2024, under President Joe Biden’s administration, the United States crafted its strategy around clearly defined «red lines,» enabling it to provide significant military-technical and financial support to Ukraine while minimizing the likelihood of direct military confrontation with Russia. Below is a detailed chronology of Russian-American contacts, structured around four key interaction formats: «Patrushev — Sullivan and Burns,» «Naryshkin and Burns,» «Shoigu and Austin,» and «Gerasimov and Milley.»
Experience of Interaction: Military Conflicts and «Red Telephones»
Post-Soviet relations between Russia and the United States have weathered numerous severe crises, particularly when the two nations found themselves on opposing sides of armed conflicts. The 2008 war in Georgia and the Syrian conflict, which began in 2015, stand out as vivid examples. These cases underscored the complexity of diplomatic engagement and the limited opportunities for coordinating actions, even in critical situations threatening direct clashes.
During the August 2008 war in Georgia, several telephone conversations took place between Russian and U.S. leadership. U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev discussed the situation in South Ossetia and prospects for halting military operations. Initial contacts occurred on August 9, with Bush urging Russia to cease military actions and respect Georgia’s territorial integrity. That same day, active negotiations unfolded at the diplomatic level between U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Exchanges between Moscow and Washington continued on August 10 and 11. During these days, the White House publicly condemned Russia’s actions as «disproportionate,» and Bush emphasized the need for all troops to return to their pre-August 6 positions. Russia maintained that its military intervention was a necessary response to Georgian forces’ actions in South Ossetia. In phone calls, Medvedev argued that the operation aimed at «coercing peace» and protecting Russian citizens.
On August 12, Medvedev announced the end of the military operation—a decision reportedly discussed in phone contacts with U.S. leadership, according to some sources. Washington continued to press for a full withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and adherence to the promised ceasefire. During this period, the Bush administration actively engaged NATO allies and European leaders, including French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who mediated the crisis resolution.
In the following days, the U.S. shifted focus to providing humanitarian aid to Georgia. American military personnel organized deliveries of medicine, food, and other essential resources to Tbilisi. The Bush administration also reevaluated military cooperation plans with Russia, canceling joint exercises. While leader-level contacts persisted, tensions between the two sides markedly increased.
The 2008 Georgia war became one of the first major flashpoints between Russia and the U.S. in the post-Soviet era. In the years that followed, contradictions between the two nations continued to grow. The Syrian war offered another striking example, with Washington and Moscow again backing opposing forces. While diplomatic and political channels dominated U.S.-Russia interactions in 2008, the Syrian conflict saw a shift toward military coordination to avoid battlefield clashes.
When Russia launched its military operation in Syria in 2015, the defense ministries of Russia and the U.S. agreed to maintain contacts to prevent direct confrontations. A Memorandum on Flight Safety was signed in October, though it did not entail joint operational planning. Tensions escalated in November when Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24M, eroding trust between the nations. In 2017, the U.S. struck the Syrian Shayrat airbase and later downed a Syrian Su-22, prompting Russia to suspend military cooperation.
In 2018, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis advocated for resuming dialogue, but tensions persisted. In February, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, alongside Syrian forces, attempted to attack the Conoco plant, controlled by Kurdish-Arab SDF forces. The U.S.-led coalition responded with airstrikes involving drones, fighters, and artillery, killing dozens—or possibly hundreds—of fighters, including Russians. Before the strike, U.S. forces attempted to contact Russian command, only to be told no Russian troops were in the area.
U.S.-Russia interaction in Syria never evolved into full-fledged cooperation, but the need for functional communication channels remained undeniable. This became especially clear in subsequent years as new geopolitical challenges emerged. By 2021, amid rising global tensions, contacts between senior security officials like Nikolai Patrushev and Jake Sullivan took on strategic importance. However, their focus gradually shifted: arms control discussions gave way to growing confrontation over Ukraine.
Patrushev vs. Sullivan and Burns
In 2021, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discussed strategic stability and prospects for arms control cooperation. By late 2021 and early 2022, the agenda shifted dramatically as Washington increasingly warned Moscow against military pressure on Ukraine. After the full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022, Patrushev-Sullivan contacts persisted, though they grew far more strained. The U.S. sharply condemned Russia’s aggression, while Patrushev decried «baseless sanctions» and «U.S. interference in Russia’s internal affairs.»
Nevertheless, both sides recognized the need to maintain direct lines to avert a nuclear scenario. According to a November 2022 Wall Street Journal article, Sullivan held secret talks with senior Russian officials—namely Putin advisor Yuri Ushakov and Nikolai Patrushev—for months. The aim was to prevent further escalation of the Ukraine conflict and ensure Moscow did not resort to nuclear weapons or expand hostilities beyond Ukraine. The White House did not publicly confirm these talks, but sources told the newspaper that preserving direct Kremlin channels was deemed essential—especially as Moscow repeatedly hinted at possibly deploying its nuclear arsenal. Simultaneously, Sullivan visited Kyiv, urging Ukrainian leaders to publicly signal openness to diplomacy without pushing compromises that clashed with Ukraine’s interests.
Alongside Sullivan’s talks with Patrushev, CIA Director William Burns joined the dialogue. In confidential discussions with Patrushev, Burns warned of Washington’s response to any hypothetical use of tactical nuclear weapons by Moscow. Some meetings were held discreetly in third countries, but their overarching goal was to keep the conflict within its existing framework, avoiding escalation beyond Ukraine or a direct U.S.-Russia clash.
Naryshkin and Burns
Parallel to his exchanges with Patrushev, Burns established another strategically vital link—with Russian SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin. Months before the full-scale war, Burns, leveraging his prior experience as U.S. ambassador to Russia, acted as a «shadow negotiator» for Biden’s team, cautioning the Kremlin about the dire consequences of an invasion. Once hostilities erupted, this channel gained even greater significance.
According to media reports, Burns and Naryshkin met in Ankara in November 2022 to delineate acceptable limits. Their talks touched on nuclear security and Washington’s «behind-the-scenes» criticism of certain Ukrainian operations—like the Nord Stream explosions or incursions into Russia—conducted without U.S. approval. Naryshkin held a hard line, insisting Moscow would not abandon its plans but wished to maintain communication to prevent the conflict from inadvertently escalating into a NATO war. Thus, the «Naryshkin-Burns» line became the most discreet format, enabling intelligence agencies to exchange highly sensitive information directly.
Shoigu and Austin
Military communication unfolded at the defense minister level, though this channel nearly fell silent in the initial weeks of the war. Before February 2022, Sergey Shoigu and Lloyd Austin discussed «stability and strategic risks.» As Russian troops massed near Ukraine’s border, Austin unsuccessfully tried contacting Shoigu to urge de-escalation and avert a full-scale war. Their first post-February 24 conversation occurred only in May 2022. No concrete agreements emerged, but they agreed to stay in touch.
October 2022 marked a peak in tensions. According to U.S. journalist Bob Woodward, Austin effectively warned Shoigu that a Russian nuclear strike would lift «all U.S. self-restraints,» isolating Moscow globally. Shoigu retorted that he wouldn’t tolerate threats, to which Austin replied he commanded «the most powerful military in history» and wasn’t bluffing. Days later, Shoigu initiated a call, alleging Ukraine planned a «dirty bomb.» Austin dismissed the claim skeptically. Despite the intense friction, the phone line remained active—such as during the March 2023 U.S. drone incident.
Gerasimov and Milley
Another critical contact point was the «Valery Gerasimov (Russian Chief of General Staff) — Mark Milley (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)» format. Before the Ukraine war, the generals periodically discussed Syria and measures to prevent military incidents. In January-February 2022, Milley sought assurances from Gerasimov that Moscow wouldn’t take extreme steps, but communication soon faltered—Washington noted Gerasimov «stopped picking up.» Dialogue resumed in May to clarify positions.
The most critical exchange occurred in October 2022. Milley pressed Gerasimov to specify conditions for nuclear use, receiving references to Russian doctrine: regime defense, countering a WMD strike, or averting «catastrophic battlefield losses.» Milley countered that «none of these conditions would be met» and nuclear use remained highly unlikely. In March 2023, they discussed a U.S. drone incident over the Black Sea, again stressing the need to avoid a Russia-NATO clash. By December 2024, Gerasimov spoke with Milley’s successor, Charles Brown, about Russia’s «Oreshnik» missile strike on Dnipro and efforts to curb further escalation.
Conclusion
In May 2022, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines warned that a Ukrainian defeat could pose an existential threat to Putin, potentially heightening nuclear risks. In a Senate report, she noted that worsening Russian battlefield prospects might drive the Kremlin to drastic measures—full mobilization, martial law, or even nuclear use.
Per Bob Woodward’s book War (pp. 159−162), Washington grew deeply concerned in fall 2022 about Russia’s potential nuclear escalation in Ukraine. Intelligence suggested Putin, under pressure from military setbacks, might consider tactical nuclear weapons.
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan tackled this issue, analyzing intelligence and coordinating responses. On September 25, he publicly warned Moscow of «catastrophic consequences» for nuclear use, a message reiterated privately via secure channels. President Joe Biden personally oversaw the situation, instructing Sullivan to immediately engage Russian counterparts with stern yet measured warnings. Biden sought to prevent nuclear use of any scale. He also tasked CIA Director Bill Burns with opening a Kremlin channel—not to negotiate Ukraine, but to avert a U.S.-Russia catastrophe.
Post-February 24, 2022, despite efforts to isolate Russia globally, the U.S. sustained communication with Russian leadership across key channels, deliberately adhering to limits to prevent a global nuclear standoff. This approach effectively curbed escalation—nuclear threats surfaced but never materialized. However, it constrained deeper U.S. involvement alongside Ukraine, limiting Kyiv’s ability to swiftly reclaim occupied territories. The delicate balance between aiding Ukraine and avoiding direct conflict with nuclear-armed Russia shaped the diplomatic, intelligence, and military interactions between the two powers in 2021−2024.
