The political events unfolding in Romania concern the EU, but they worry neighboring Moldova even more. Romania risks allowing extremists into governing positions for the first time since the December 1989 revolution against Nicolae Ceaușescu. The established political forces, the Constitutional Court, and law enforcement agencies in Romania seem united in their efforts to keep far-right candidates away from the levers of power. However, Călin Georgescu, who was banned by the Constitutional Court from participating in elections due to various allegations, including illicit financing, has already been replaced by George Simion. Simion is «blacklisted» in Moldova and Ukraine for territorial revanchism and advocates for a more sovereigntist and Romania-centered approach to relations with the EU. While Simion positions himself closely to the US Donald Trump administration, he stands in opposition to the EU. With a Moldovan government that has grown very close to Brussels, Moldova’s ties with Romania will take a brutal turn if George Simion becomes the new president of Romania.
Romania’s Rise of the Far-Right and Accusations of Russian Interference
Over the past decade, Romania has delivered political surprises to foreign audiences when protests erupt in response to corruption scandals. In 2015, protests ensued following allegations of corruption in the license-issuing and inspection procedures that failed to prevent the fire at Bucharest’s «Colectiv» Club during a rock concert. Consequently, the Social Democrats’ government was dismissed. A few years later, in 2017−2018, hundreds of thousands of Romanians once again took to the streets to protest against the Social Democrats and their repeated attempts to loosen the penal code, introducing decriminalizing loopholes for corruption offenses. Currently, the protests are driven by ideological confrontations. In mid-March, Romanians organized pro-EU demonstrations in response to concerns about the rise of openly far-right politicians in top political positions. During the same period, supporters of far-right leader Călin Georgescu protested against his exclusion by the Romanian Constitutional Court from the presidential elections scheduled for May 4 and 18.
In early December 2024, the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the electoral process, invoking Russian interference in manipulating TikTok’s algorithm to support Călin Georgescu. The evidence provided by law enforcement agencies indicated that 25,000 accounts on TikTok increased Călin Georgescu’s popularity. This inauthentic coordinated behavior on TikTok, used by about 9 million Romanians, was classified as «Russian hybrid actions.» Therefore, the presidential elections were rescheduled for May 2025. On page 16 of the Venice Commission’s report regarding the cancellation of the Romanian presidential elections, it objected to the annulment based solely on intelligence service reports, as this fails to provide «the necessary transparency and verifiability.»
The far-right political parties, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and the Party of Young People (POT), have united around Călin Georgescu to present a single candidate for the presidential elections. Their key strategy is to transfer public support from the «victimized» Călin Georgescu to AUR’s leader, George Simion. The leader of POT, Anamaria Gavrilă, stepped back from the presidential race in favor of Simion. Polls published in March show that George Simion would gain 30.4%, followed by the Mayor of Bucharest, Nicuşor Dan, with 26%, and the joint candidate of the ruling coalition (PSD, PNL, and UDMR), Crin Antonescu, with 17.9%. If these results materialize, then AUR’s leader, George Simion, has a clear chance to be the frontrunner in the second round, where he will likely encounter an anti-far-right «cordon sanitaire» against him.
Russia’s Place in the Romanian Riddle
At first, Russia’s interference in Romanian electoral events was hard to believe. Among Central and Eastern European states, Romania has always been closer to Poland than Hungary in its attitude toward Russia. Like in Warsaw, negative historical experiences have influenced sentiments in Bucharest. The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which resulted in territorial losses for Romania, part of which became today’s Republic of Moldova, is a post-WWII chapter that Romania has never ceased to condemn. Consequently, Călin Georgescu emerged, calling Vladimir Putin a «leader patriot» for Russia. Even though Georgescu openly recognized that he was not Putin’s fan, his positive comments about Putin’s style of governance alerted Romania’s political and intellectual elites.
Romania’s law enforcement aimed to uncover evidence of Russian support for Georgescu. However, the findings don’t extend beyond traces of online manipulation of the TikTok algorithm and the promotion of Georgescu on Russian online channels, including Telegram. Some reports indicated that Georgescu was in close relations with Bogdan Vacustra, who belonged to a group of Russian spies, called «young ravens,» controlled by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), active during Socialist Romania under Ceaușescu. During his duty at Romania’s General Directorate of Army Intelligence, Vacustra acquired expertise in cryptocurrency utilization, evasion of sanctions imposed on Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as conducting special operations against adversaries. Vacustra’s connections with Georgescu heightened suspicions regarding the latter, who has been unable to explain how he can afford to pay former members of the French Foreign Legion.
There is undeniable certainty that Georgescu explicitly demonstrated alignment with Moscow, sharing comparable views on the urgency of peace in Ukraine, claims regarding the artificiality of the Ukrainian state, and the potential future territorial division of Ukraine. These narratives aligned Georgescu closely with the official discourse of Moscow. Similarly, Georgescu has actively promoted the agenda of the «sovereigntists» against the EU’s supranational attributions. The sovereigntist narrative was embraced by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which depicted the criminal investigations conducted by Romanian prosecutors against Georgescu as a conspiracy by the EU against «non-systemic» leaders like Viktor Orban and Robert Fico.
Georgescu’s views on Ukraine and the EU resonate with the discourse of AUR’s leader, George Simion, who is the sole representative of the far right in the presidential election race. The surging Romanian far right can engage a diverse voter base. In addition to far-right supporters, rural and disillusioned social groups, including those in the diaspora, rallied behind Georgescu’s anti-globalist rhetoric. More than two million Romanians who cast their votes for him in the first round of the 2024 elections, which were canceled, tend to lean toward Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, their shared aim is to dislodge the establishment forces rather than demand Romania’s exit from the EU.
The Complicated Dialogue of Moldova with the Romanian Far-Right
Moldova is entirely unprepared for situations where Romania poses a political challenge. Since Moldova’s independence, it has been perceived as a problematic partner due to pro-Russian forces, which were usually at the heart of bilateral animosities. It’s mainly the Moldovan language and identity, regarded in Bucharest as an artificial artifact of Soviet construction of today’s Moldovan state, that have consistently fueled tensions. This position was incompatible with the stance of the political forces opposed to reunification with Romania. The 2009 youth unrest against the electoral victory of the Communists in Moldova strained relations between the two countries. Under suspicion of Romania’s involvement in the riots, the then-government reintroduced visas for Romanian citizens, which were removed the same year by the new government.
Today, potential complications in bilateral relations may arise from Bucharest, where far-right parties have a strong candidate, George Simion, in the upcoming presidential elections. His potential victory would contradict the Moldovan government’s current policy, which has maintained Simion under an entry ban into Moldova since 2018, when it was initially introduced for five years until 2023, on the grounds of public order security. In February 2025, Simion’s political party, AUR, urged Moldovan President Maia Sandu to abolish the interdiction. One of the arguments invoked is that AUR is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR), which holds 78 out of 720 seats in the 2024−2029 European Parliament, of which AUR secured six seats. The Moldovan side might feel justified in keeping the ban on Simion because of a similar decision by Ukraine. He is accused of making statements against Ukrainian territorial integrity and of having connections with Russian secret services.
Simion is already engaging with political processes in Chișinău. The leaders of the «Democracy at Home» Party, which is critical of the Moldovan government, were invited to speak during Simion’s press conference at the Romanian Parliament in February. Such actions of «remote» implications of AUR in Moldovan politics might increase if Simion’s ban were lifted. This explains why the Moldovan ruling party, the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), and Maia Sandu have been reluctant to lift the travel restrictions against AUR’s leader, George Simion. In anticipation of the 2025 parliamentary elections in Moldova, the risks of political interference from Simion and his AUR party are perceived as even higher in Chișinău.
Moldova’s Dependencies on Romania
Various forms of proximity between Moldova and Romania include geographic, historical-linguistic, economic, and geopolitical dimensions. Without Romanian diplomatic support, Moldova would have fewer allied voices in EU institutions. Furthermore, European perspectives on Moldova would be unrealistic without the EU acquis in the Romanian language, enshrined in Moldova’s constitution, Article 13, and spoken by most Moldovans.
From an economic perspective, approximately 25% of Moldovan exports to the European market go to Romania. The most significant dependence on Romania is in the energy sector. Over the past years of the energy crisis induced by Russia, the 150-km-long Iași-Ungheni-Chișinău gas pipeline constitutes an alternative route through which Moldova acquires natural gas from Europe, including Romania. Moldova imported two-thirds of its gas from Romania through this pipeline in the first nine months of 2024. Altogether, the volume of imported gas amounts to one billion cubic meters per year, or approximately 3 million cubic meters monthly. During the energy crisis in early 2025, Romania increased its gas exports to up to 5.6 million cubic meters per day, the maximum capacity of the Iași-Ungheni-Chișinău gas pipeline. While representing a strategic alternative to Russian gas, leveraged for geopolitical purposes, the gas bought in Europe and imported from Romania exceeded 500 euros per 1,000 cubic meters in late 2024. Furthermore, Romanian electricity replaced that previously purchased from the Transnistrian region, exceeding 50% of total electricity consumption on the other side of the Prut River. Romania also provided diesel as humanitarian aid to Moldovan farmers facing bank debt and the effects of the 2022 drought.
Scenarios: Hostile Romania-Moldova Relations Due to Far-Right Rise Are Possible
If AUR’s leader wins Romania’s presidential elections, the repercussions for Moldova are almost inevitable. Moldovan unionist populists will be motivated by the electoral validation of public support for AUR and other far-right elements, who feel represented by the figure of Călin Georgescu. At the same time, the rise of AUR in Romania will strengthen the skeptical discourse toward Romania, which already exists in the context of the appointments of Romanian citizens to key positions in the banking and judicial sectors, resorting to apparent deviations from the norm by the PAS-Sandu government. The primary beneficiaries of the political victory of the Romanian far right could be the Socialist Party and other political forces that use the pro-Moldovan «sovereigntist» discourse.
Three main scenarios could play out for Moldova if George Simion becomes the new Romanian president.
According to the first scenario, the Moldovan government could decide to reconcile with George Simion and AUR out of survival necessity. Chișinău will have no choice but to cooperate with the new Romanian president. Moldova’s pragmatic approach will be driven by the fear of returning to dependence on Russia (trade, energy, etc.), which is currently mitigated by Moldova’s access to Romania’s market, energy resources, and infrastructure.
Another plausible scenario involves Moldova potentially enacting a temporary «boycott» against Simion, the new Romanian president, to ensure a favorable outcome in this year’s Moldovan legislative elections. If warming relations between Sandu and Simion, the far-right leader, occur too swiftly, opposition forces, including pro-Russian factions, in Moldova will exploit the situation to enhance their performance in the parliamentary elections. Given Simion’s Eurosceptic approach toward Brussels, the current strategic dialogue between Moldova and Romania, including on European integration, could be downgraded to lower-level, yet still constructive, relations.
Lastly, an adverse scenario could involve a sort of «political conflict» between the two capitals based on geopolitically contradictory stances. Simion’s victory would mean strengthening the «sovereigntists» in Romania. This could irritate Bucharest’s relations with Chișinău if PAS aligned with the EU against Simion. This situation may be exacerbated if Simion, as a potential future President of Romania, positions himself closer to the US and Donald Trump than to the EU. In light of this, Moldova’s European accession could face a trajectory similar to that of Ukraine, which is currently slowed down by Hungary. The Moldovan government may find itself in a position to learn how to coexist with a more hostile Romania without compromising its vital economic and energy interests. At all times, friendly ties with Romania serve to counter the rise of pro-Russian sentiments, especially ahead of the critical legislative elections in 2025.
