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Putin and Trump in Rare Earth Land

Andrey Pertsev summarizes the political events of the week (February 24−28)

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Possible negotiations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin remain the main topic for the Kremlin, Russian elites, and now Russian society as well. According to a regular poll by FOM, anxiety among citizens began to drop sharply after news emerged about the improvement of U.S.-Russian dialogue. In late December, 46% of respondents reported a «sense of anxiety» among those around them (the same percentage said the mood was «calm»), while today only 38% feel this way (the share of «calm» responses has risen to 55%). Federal television cautiously praises Trump, though it tries to portray Putin as the stronger figure, whose wise ideas the American authorities are simply forced to follow.

It’s rather difficult to discern any real achievements in the negotiation process that could justify such turbo-optimism. American and Russian sources (both anonymous and authorized) mention different dates for potential meetings that ultimately never take place. Despite propaganda efforts, the American side is clearly leading this dialogue—proposals are first voiced by U.S. authorities, and the Kremlin and Putin then pick them up. For example, this is evident in statements about Washington’s interest in Russian rare earth metals. Trump and Putin spoke about them almost simultaneously, but this followed news of the White House’s interest in Ukraine’s reserves of such metals. Russia tried to ride the wave of this interest by offering its own deposits, along with other resources and the Arctic. The global rare earth metals market is relatively small in monetary terms, and such a deal is unlikely to be seen as a subject for negotiations at the level of the two countries’ leaders. Thus, it can be assumed that the Kremlin and American leadership have yet to find other topics for dialogue where even a ritualistic mutual understanding might be possible.

The Russian side is currently betting on Trump’s pragmatism. This explains the presence of Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, in the negotiating team, Dmitriev’s proposals for cooperation in the Arctic and oil production, and Putin’s own statements about rare earth metals. At the same time, the Kremlin is clearly counting on Trump being in a hurry, supposedly needing a Russia-Ukraine truce as soon as possible to present himself as a master dealmaker and great peacemaker. Whether this is truly important to Trump himself remains an open question.

The Kremlin is evidently testing the waters to raise its stakes in the negotiations. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov have stated that Russia has no intention of relinquishing territories now enshrined in its Constitution, which lists the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions as fully Russian. Russia does not control the cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, nor several large settlements in the Donetsk region, and is unlikely to seize them militarily anytime soon. Last summer, Vladimir Putin stated that the Ukrainian army must voluntarily abandon these territories. It seems the Russian president has no intention of abandoning this idea yet.

Negotiations between Trump and Putin are stalling, and the Kremlin is placing a contradictory bet—on one hand, making lofty territorial demands, and on the other, luring with resources. This tactic is already being critically assessed by Russian military bloggers, who are outraged that the authorities are willing to share resources with an America that was hostile just yesterday. Moreover, the narrative of defending resources from the treacherous West has long been a cornerstone of Russian propaganda. People who believed this message now feel disillusioned, and they form the core of Putin’s support. The disappointment of Putin’s sincere supporters is unlikely to positively affect his real approval rating, but the turbo-optimism of the majority of citizens may offset these losses for now. The Kremlin is banking on this majority, though if the negotiations fail, they too will be deeply disappointed.

Attack on the Terminator Governor

The FSB and investigators detained Denis Alekseev, deputy governor of the Vologda region, and Kirill Bocharov, head of the region’s Moscow office, for accepting a 100-million-ruble bribe. Georgy Filimonov, the region’s governor—who became one of Russia’s most prominent governors in a short time—and his team have suffered their first serious blow. Filimonov has pushed controversial initiatives (closing liquor stores, unveiling a Stalin monument), posted provocative videos portraying himself as an ultra-patriot squared, and simultaneously waged war against Severstal, one of Russia’s largest metallurgical companies and the region’s biggest firm. The governor challenged Severstal’s founder, Alexey Mordashov, to a «tatami mat showdown» (Filimonov is a professional martial artist), accused the company’s plants of harming the region’s ecology, and fired officials linked to it.

Shortly before Alekseev’s arrest, Cherepovets mayor Vadim Germanov—one of Mordashov’s last appointees—left his post under pressure from the regional leadership. It’s quite possible that the arrest of officials close to Filimonov was the corporation’s retaliation for his attacks and a hint to back off. However, observers might doubt that the governor will yield to pressure so easily—he’s invested too much in his image as a «Terminator governor» in a Stalin-style tunic. Ultra-patriotism squared is just one part of this persona. Another component is the constant buzz in major Telegram channels about Filimonov’s high-profile backers, such as Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Presidential Administration’s political bloc, and Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev, both long-time martial arts enthusiasts who trained with Filimonov’s father, a well-known athlete, in the early 1990s. Filimonov is also linked to the circle (or perhaps the semi-mythical «club») of Putin’s daughter, Ekaterina Tikhonova. His policies and feud with Severstal are framed as a bold Kremlin experiment, one that could be replicated if successful.

But judging by Filimonov’s career path and administration, he enjoys no special patronage from Kiriyenko or Trutnev. He does know Tikhonova, but through her ex-husband, Kirill Shamalov. Elements of this «social experiment,» like banning liquor stores, have even drawn criticism from Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Filimonov, however, paid no heed. His tactic is understandable: if he responds to these rebukes, it’ll become clear he has no special connections—he’s not a Terminator governor, just an ordinary regional head. Thus, he’s unlikely to react to his subordinates’ arrests or soften his stance, and the stakes in this standoff between Georgy Filimonov and Severstal will only rise.

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