The weeks leading up to Hungary’s parliamentary elections on 12 April are marked by high tensions. At stake is not only Hungary’s political future but also the EU’s opportunity to end the vetoes that have harmed Ukraine while favouring Russia. In both Brussels and EU national capitals, there is a tacit preference for replacing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—leader of the ruling Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz)—with the opposition.
Such a change would curb Russia’s ability to undermine EU unanimity-based decision-making through Orbán’s repeated interventions. Cautious about fuelling Eurosceptic discourse ahead of the vote, the EU has toned down direct criticism of Orbán. Any EU involvement in debates about the Hungarian elections risks reinforcing Hungarian claims of foreign interference. The EU is well aware that Hungary enjoys backing from the United States, which has accused the EU of alleged electoral interference in eight member states.
By framing the EU’s measures to protect elections from disinformation as online censorship aimed at influencing votes, the US has also downplayed Russian interference in Romania’s 2024 presidential elections. Echoing these US narratives, Orbán has likened the EU to «a repressive machinery» that must be removed from Hungary after the elections, while portraying Russia in relatively positive terms. Unlike previous campaigns that targeted civil society linked to George Soros, the current Fidesz electoral propaganda focuses squarely on Ukraine. Orbán’s rhetoric thus converges with Russian narratives that depict Ukraine as a potential source of war for the EU and as a burden in the enlargement process. This symbiosis between Hungary’s official anti-EU and anti-Ukraine discourse and Russian disinformation serves two main goals: boosting Fidesz’s re-election chances and weakening Ukraine’s position in ongoing peace negotiations.
Russian Distorted Analogy with Romania
For the first time in 16 years, the opposition Respect and Freedom Party («Tisza») has a real chance to end Orbán’s rule. Independent polls give Tisza up to a 10% lead. By contrast, government-linked polls—from the Nézőpont Institute and the Centre for Fundamental Rights—put Fidesz in first place with up to 47% of the vote, ahead of Tisza by 6−7%. A third contender likely to cross the 5% threshold is the far-right «Our Homeland Movement» («Mi Hazánk»). As a result, Tisza would need more than 50% of the votes to prevent Orbán from forming a coalition with the far-right party.
Exposure to rhetoric portraying the EU and Ukraine as enemies could push dissatisfied Hungarian voters—frustrated by corruption or socioeconomic issues—to back a more nationalistic alternative rather than the opposition. This dynamic may explain why Russian propaganda channels are amplifying hostile narratives from Orbán and his close ally, Foreign Minister and Trade Péter Szijjártó. If mobilising Fidesz’s core voters falls short, the anti-EU and anti-Ukraine vote would not be wasted but redirected to «Our Homeland Movement».
Russian officials have joined in framing allegations of EU and Ukrainian involvement in Hungary’s elections as a joint front against Orbán. This narrative was first advanced by Szijjártó and quickly echoed by Aleksey Pushkov, head of the Federation Council Commission on Information Policy. Pushkov used false analogies to dismiss claims of Russian interference in European elections and to portray the EU as a malign actor, citing the US report. He even insinuated that Hungary’s elections might be cancelled, as in Romania—though repeating the Romanian scenario is technically impossible.
First, the Romanian case unfolded during the 2024 presidential elections, when the leading right-wing candidate, Călin Georgescu, was suspected of benefiting from Russia-manipulated algorithms on TikTok. Replicating this would be nonsensical, as it would require Russia to back Tisza leader Péter Magyar. It is equally implausible that the EU would violate its Digital Services Act to artificially boost Orbán’s rival on monitored online platforms.
Second, the Romanian scenario cannot be transposed to Hungary, where key state institutions—including law enforcement and the constitutional court—are widely seen as politically controlled by Fidesz. In Romania, by contrast, the Constitutional Court annulled the presidential elections on 6 December 2024 after the Supreme Council of National Defence (then chaired by President Klaus Iohannis) declassified information. That decision followed the first-round success of the perceived pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, who garnered over two million votes on 24 November 2024.
Without assessing the proportionality of Romania’s response in nullifying the elections, it is clear the intervention stemmed from concerns over a pro-Russian president. Pushkov’s parallel with Romania only makes sense if one assumes Hungarian institutions would annul an election by claiming external interference had facilitated Péter Magyar’s victory. In reality, only a reversal of the Romanian case could occur—annulling results because a pro-EU force won. Such a move would trigger mass protests and force new elections, in which Tisza would likely secure over 50% more easily. Moreover, Orbán could not cancel the elections without damaging his reputation as Donald Trump’s key MAGA ally in Europe. If Fidesz finishes second, Orbán’s safest path would be to form a coalition with «Our Homeland Movement» against Tisza.
Hungary and Russia’s Portrayal of Ukraine as a Combined EU Electoral Interference
Disputes between Hungary and Ukraine have steadily worsened as Russian aggression has intensified since February 2022. Orbán’s frequent vetoes—blocking sanctions on Russia and delaying EU financial or military aid to Ukraine—have acted as a catalyst. The latest episode involved blocking the first tranche of the EU’s € 90 billion loan package, vital for Ukraine’s budget stability, IMF credit line feasibility, and accession process. As reported by the Financial Times, Hungary also opposed replenishing funds for Ukraine via joint EU debt backed by the EU budget—a procedure requiring unanimity. In justifying the block, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó argued it was meant to condition resumption of oil supply via the Druzhba pipeline from Ukraine. Hungary claimed Ukraine would violate the 2014 Association Agreement; Articles 272 and 276 require facilitating energy transit while minimising supply interruption risks and ensuring quick resumption when halted.
Orbán seized the incident to spin a conspiracy theory: the EU and Ukraine are not urging Druzhba rehabilitation as part of economic pressure on Hungary. He went further, accusing Ukraine of sowing chaos by driving up prices to bolster support for an opposition-led government. Szijjártó echoed this, claiming that without Russian oil via the unrepaired pipeline, the EU and Ukraine aim to raise prices and influence the vote. Slovakia joined Hungary in requesting a «fact-finding mission» to investigate the pipeline on Ukrainian soil. Kremlin special envoy Kirill Dmitriev, overseeing US-led Ukraine peace talks, amplified Hungary’s stance on X, echoing claims of EU-Ukraine election interference.
Hungary’s Druzhba narrative has also incorporated allegations linking Ukraine to the Nord Stream 2 explosion as «state terrorism.» Russia has spread related conspiracy theories about Ukrainian sabotage risks to the Turkish Stream and Blue Stream in the Black Sea. Orbán shows no interest in de-escalating Druzhba disputes—otherwise, he would have accepted Croatia’s offer to use the Adriatic Oil Pipeline (up to 15 million tons annually) to supply Hungary and Slovakia adequately. Instead, Druzhba serves as a pretext for Orbán’s «veto bazooka» against Ukraine across sanctions on Russia, renewed aid, and EU accession talks.
A Special Russian Operation to Escalate Tensions Between Hungary and Ukraine?
The picture painted by Hungary and amplified by Russia contrasts sharply with reality. The oil transit disruption stemmed from Russian strikes. According to Ukraine’s oil transportation company Ukrtransnafta, Hungarian and Slovak authorities were informed that Russian airstrikes on 27 January damaged the Druzhba pipeline. Combined with other attacks on energy infrastructure, this has limited Ukraine’s technical capacity for repairs.
Ukraine has reminded Hungary that it does not blame Russian airstrikes for the malfunction—yet accuses Budapest of dependence on Russian oil. Kyiv has denied delaying repairs, countering another narrative pushed by Hungary and Slovakia. Dismissing the EU as a credible broker, Hungary and Slovakia imposed what they called retaliatory measures by suspending diesel deliveries to Ukraine (essential for its economy and army). Both also threatened to halt emergency electricity exports amid Russia’s «winterisation» tactics of systematically destroying Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
Russia’s targeting of Druzhba may be a calculated military operation with hybrid effects on Hungary’s elections. First, escalating the oil dispute—backed by Slovakia’s Robert Fico—fuels hostile narratives about Ukraine among Hungarian voters ahead of April. Hungarian officials have linked the suspension to an alleged EU-Ukraine conspiracy supporting the opposition against Orbán, resembling a psychological operation. Second, state-controlled Hungarian and Russian media have reframed the dispute as Ukrainian electoral interference, largely ignoring that Russia deliberately caused the crisis through attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Finally, the Druzhba attack fits Russia’s broader strategy, with effects beyond the elections: Orbán can use the crisis to justify blocking Ukraine’s EU membership while continuing to demonise it as Hungary’s enemy.
