On Moldova’s Independence Day, the 27th of August, President Maia Sandu stood alongside some of Europe’s most powerful leaders: French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Addressing the Moldovan crowd, Tusk urged them to side with the European Union instead of Russia: «You have shown the world that Moldova lives by our common values, European values: freedom, democracy, solidarity. Do not let Russia return here.»
The fact that this trio prioritized a visit to the small, landlocked country, stuck between Ukraine and Romania, indicates just how high the stakes have become. This was not a case of routine diplomacy, but a symbolic show of EU readiness and willingness to integrate Moldova. It sent a collective signal to Moscow that Moldova now sits at the frontline.
Despite the modest size of the post-Soviet republic, it remains top of mind for officials in both the Kremlin and Brussels. Nearly half of Moldova’s border with Ukraine runs along Transnistria, a Russian-backed, self-governing breakaway region, leaving the country neutral on paper, as per the constitution, but contested in reality.
When analyzing Moldova as a Russia-EU frontier, it should be made clear that the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion in the near future is highly unlikely. We argue that the biggest threat to Moldova’s security stems from Russia’s hybrid warfare playbook. A playbook that is already tried and tested in Moldova.
In this article, we dissect Russia’s means of influence and the options available for the EU to counter this. In this regard, the termination of the gas transit deal in January 2025 and the upcoming Moldovan elections on September 28th are critical illustrations of the future of Moldova’s security.
We argue that the stakes extend well beyond Moldova’s borders. What happens in Moldova will highlight the EU’s ability to project stability and protect its influence in the post-Soviet space—or whether Russia still can assert dominance along Europe’s eastern flank.
Pipeline pressure
On 1 January 2025, Ukraine decided not to renew a gas transit agreement with Russia that had enabled the delivery of energy to Moldova through the breakaway region of Transnistria. Moldova has been trying to diversify its energy supplies since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, accelerating this process after 2022. This includes the construction of new pipelines running through Romania as well as purchasing from various European vendors and even storing gas abroad. However, despite warnings from Ukraine that it might suspend the flow of Russian gas through its territory, Chișinău has remained de facto dependent on Russian energy, sourcing up to 80% of its electricity from Transnistrian power plants running on Russian gas.
Moldova’s and Transnistria’s energy deliveries were further compromised when an alternative supply route through Türkiye and the Trans-Balkan pipeline was halted. This happened after Gazprom on 28 December 2024 suspended deliveries to Moldova, after accusing Moldova of accumulating a debt of USD 709 million to the company. Moldova has subsequently refused to pay this amount, citing an international audit which concluded that the actual debt amounts to only USD 8.6 million. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean has condemned the decision as an instance of «Kremlin gas blackmail,» arguing that its timing reflected a deliberate effort by Moscow to destabilize the country and to sway Transnistrian voters against the Moldovan government.
In combination, these disruptions had substantial consequences for both Moldova and Transnistria, contributing to a sudden 50% increase in the price of electricity, a 25% increase in the price of heating, and a 9.1% rise in inflation (year-on-year). Transnistria, however, was disproportionately affected, as the absence of reliable gas deliveries triggered a humanitarian crisis with no heating and rolling blackouts during the cold winter months.
Moldova, on the other hand, had to rely on new supply routes which were significantly more expensive. On the 27th of January 2025, the EU therefore proposed an initial emergency assistance package of € 30 million to support Moldova and Transnistria, aimed at restoring electricity and heating in Transnistria by purchasing European and Ukrainian gas. Subsequently, in February 2025, the European Commission and Moldova signed a two-year Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience, further allocating € 250 million to Chișinău and € 60 million to Transnistria. This, in turn, diminished Russia’s ability to blame the increased cost of living for ordinary Moldovans on the central administration in Chișinău and, hence, to sway the Moldovan electorate.
However, after staying silent for a week, Transnistrian authorities rejected the EU’s financial assistance. Moldovan Prime Minister Recean attributed this to pressure from Moscow, remarking that «Russia does not allow them to accept European aid for fear of losing control over the region.» Instead, Transnistria prioritized the Hungarian-owned company MET Group to supply natural gas to the region. The payment was handled through a Dubai-based company (JNX General Trading L.L.C) and has been facilitated through Russian credit and operational support. The president of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, even thanked the representatives of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation for their help.
The gas supplies from MET Group represent only a temporary solution. In June 2025, Transnistrian Economic Development Minister Sergei Obolonik emphasized that forecasts for Transnistria’s economy are bleak, citing uncertainty over gas supplies. If the issue of gas deliveries is not solved, the humanitarian crisis in Transnistria will only be exacerbated as we approach Moldovan autumn and winter. To Russia, a struggling and energy-starved Moldovan and Transnistrian population constitutes clear leverage. As such, Russia can continue to support Transnistria through various supply options similar to the agreement made with the MET Group, while keeping EU support at bay. More generally, a hard-pressed local population is also more susceptible to pressure in the form of threats or bribes.
Tilting the vote
On the 28th of September 2025, Moldovan voters head to the polls in a parliamentary election significantly marked by large-scale Russian influence operations that will define Moldova’s future in the European Union. Currently, the incumbent pro-European government consisting of the Party for Action and Solidarity (PAS) leads the polls, but seems incapable of garnering enough votes to gain a majority on its own as was the case in 2021. Notwithstanding the caveat that polls in Moldova are very unreliable, PAS is believed to be able to garner only approximately 40% of the votes for the coming election.
This means that PAS will need coalition partners, creating two possible outcomes: 1) PAS forms a coalition with «Eurosceptic» parties and slows down, but does not abandon, the EU-integration track altogether, or 2) PAS forms a coalition with pro-Russian parties, like the Patriotic Bloc, steering Moldova fully away from EU membership and towards Russia. Full alignment with Moscow, however, is unlikely, as most Moldovans still see the EU as their main partner, but a Russian-leaning government could pursue what has been coined as an «à la carte» relationship with Brussels.
In this context, the 300,000 eligible Transnistrian voters, representing 8−9% of the total electorate, matter. While few voted in 2024, renewed mobilization could hand Moscow a decisive lever in September’s election. In last year’s elections, only a total of 30,000 voters turned up for elections in Transnistria. Roughly speaking then, for the coming parliamentary election Russia has a potential 270,000 hard-pressed voters at its disposal.
The degree to which pro-Russian parties will gain influence in a coming Moldovan coalition government hinges on the level of interference from Moscow. During the presidential election and referendum in the fall of 2024, some estimates suggest that Russia spent around $ 100 million to buy votes and run large disinformation campaigns. The government in Chișinău has claimed the number to be over € 200 million.
Taking center stage in Russia’s influence operation is the infamous fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, who is running his political campaign from Moscow following a sentence for his involvement in a 2014 banking fraud scandal in Moldova from which he siphoned approximately $ 1 billion. Through Shor, Russia funneled € 39 million into bank accounts of ordinary Moldovans in a scheme aimed at buying their votes before the two elections last year. In addition to direct transfers, Shor has also utilized the Russian NGO ‘Evrazia’ to pay Moldovans to vote against the EU. And in the autonomous region of Gagauzia, populated mainly by descendants of Orthodox, Russian-speaking Turks, Shor has used his ally, the local governor Evghenia Gutsul (now imprisoned), to orchestrate a parallel pension scheme transferring money to local pensioners through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank in order to rally support. This time around, however, Shor is being less discreet and is openly offering Moldovans $ 3,000 a month to take part in anti-government protests.
Besides utilizing prominent personalities like Ilan Shor, Russia is using disinformation campaigns, propaganda, and cyber-attacks extensively. By means of AI-generated bots, Russia is currently flooding the Moldovan social media space and attempting to promote pro-Russian messages through local TV channels and media websites. Russia’s messaging exploits central cleavages in Moldovan society such as liberal vs. family values; the alleged incompatibility between Moldova’s constitutional neutrality and its goal of EU membership; and, relatedly, the risk of a spillover of the war in Ukraine into Moldova. In terms of the latter, the numerous cases of Russian violations of Moldovan air space with drones and missiles have added to the fear of war in Moldovan society.
Will the EU’s response be enough?
Meanwhile, the EU is dedicating enormous amounts of resources to countering Russia’s illicit influence operation. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has opened the door for Chișinău to unlock all membership negotiation clusters this year, putting Moldova on an EU fast-track. To reinforce this trajectory, Brussels has paired explicit political backing with aid and security assistance.
In the Moldova Growth Plan, the EU pledged € 1.9 billion for reforms, economic stability, and single market access, making the EU the country’s largest trade partner and aid provider. On defense, Moldova has received about € 200 million via the European Peace Facility since 2021, including a lethal aid package of € 20 million in April 2025. Moldova also signed a Security and Defense Partnership (SAFE) as the first non-EU member, granting access to EU procurement and resilience-building programs. These measures, combined with Moldova’s modest but rising defense spending, have effectively doubled Chișinău’s military budget.
In sum, Moldova has become an indicative frontline in the contest between Russia and the EU. While a full-scale Russian invasion seems unlikely, Moscow is already shaping Moldova’s future through gas leverage and election interference. Meanwhile, the EU has responded with unprecedented aid, defense support, and an accelerated accession track. The Moldovan parliamentary vote on September 28th will serve as an important indicator of whether Moldova stays on a path toward EU membership or drifts into Moscow’s orbit.
