Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has been a vocal supporter of Russia’s war on Ukraine from the outset, but the role played by his security services — commonly known as the kadyrovtsy — has evolved significantly. Initially, their deployments to Ukraine were improvised and ad hoc, but they have since become more structured, with the creation of new units and an increasing reliance on «volunteers.» While the kadyrovtsy have helped support Russia’s war of attrition, the Chechen regime has arguably played an even greater role in shaping the narratives of the conflict and boosting mobilisation efforts. These strategies have allowed Kadyrov to demonstrate his loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin while minimising risks to his regime’s security. As a result, Kadyrov may emerge from the war with a stronger security infrastructure, though recruitment issues will likely persist.
From ad hoc to an abundance of Akhmats
At the war’s outset in February 2022, Kadyrov quickly mobilised Chechen security personnel, gathering 12,000 in Groznyy and pledging to send 70,000 volunteers to Ukraine. These statements came amid claims that Chechens were already participating in the initial Russian advance on Kyiv. Early deployments, however, were led by some of his most trusted and notorious Rosgvardia units, rather than volunteers. These included SOBR Akhmat (formerly SOBR Terek), OMON Akhmat-Groznyy, the 249th Detached Special Motorised Battalion (Yug), and the Akhmat Kadyrov 141st Special Motorised Regiment (Sever). They were joined by Interior Ministry units, such as the Akhmat Kadyrov Special Purpose Police Regiment, whose commander coordinated kadyrovtsy operations in Luhansk Oblast in 2022.
Prominent representatives of the Chechen regime have also appeared in Ukraine. Adam Delimkhanov, Chechnya’s representative in the State Duma and arguably the second most-powerful person in Chechnya, has been a key figure both on the ground and in Chechen propaganda. Kadyrov claimed that Delimkhanov personally oversaw the 2022 assault on Mariupol’s Azovstal steel plant, and he has been seen in Ukraine more frequently than he has in the hallways of the Duma. Another significant figure is Apti Alaudinov, a previously disgraced Chechen official who has redeemed himself through involvement in the war. Alaudinov commands Spetsnaz Akhmat, a notionally volunteer unit now subordinate to the Ministry of Defence that has become the primary vehicle for Chechen involvement in the war.
The emergence of Spetsnaz Akhmat as a cohesive unit is an illustration of a broader trend in the evolution of Chechnya’s war on Ukraine. Over time, there has been a proliferation of new units. In June 2022, Kadyrov announced the creation of four new Ministry of Defence units: Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, Yug-Akhmat Battalion, the Vostok-Akhmat Battalion, and the Sever-Akhmat Regiment. By late 2023, these had been followed by Akhmat-Rossiya, Akhmat-Chechnya, and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, as well as the Baysangur Benoyevskiy Battalion within Rosgvardia. This amounts to eight new units, mostly commanded by experienced kadyrovtsy and created with the express purpose of fighting in Ukraine. These have been supported by new infrastructure in Chechnya, including an expansion of the Russian University of Spetsnaz in Gudermes, and new equipment, with further resources provided by the Akhmat Kadyrov Fund.
Shaping the narrative as much as the battlefield
Chechnya’s involvement in the war is unsurprising. The kadyrovtsy participated in post-2014 operations in eastern Ukraine, where they fought against pro-Ukrainian Chechen units. They also deployed to Syria in 2014−2015 as part of Russia’s support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Kadyrov’s personal loyalty to Putin is the foundation on which the Chechen regime is built, and so his support for Putin’s war on Ukraine was to be expected.
Estimating the extent of that support, however, is challenging. Kadyrov has repeatedly claimed high deployment numbers, asserting in mid-2024 that Chechnya had sent 45,000 people to Ukraine, including 18,000 volunteers. These figures are likely inflated and include non-Chechens who have trained in Gudermes, many of whom bolster the ranks of Spetsnaz Akhmat. Information often comes from partisan sources and media reports often conflate groups, unhelpfully referring to «Akhmat» fighters even though at least 14 distinct entities bear that name — part of the cult of personality Kadyrov has built around his father.
Assessing the battlefield impact of the kadyrovtsy is equally difficult. They have often been denigrated as a «TikTok army» focused on staged propaganda, and they have been accused of sending their non-Chechens into combat first in order to preserve Chechen fighters. Kadyrov has undoubtedly exaggerated Chechen battlefield successes, and his claims that three of his children had travelled to the frontline did not withstand even minimal scrutiny. In the latest war, there does not appear to have been much evidence of the kadyrovtsy directly fighting pro-Ukrainian Chechen groups. There are several possible reasons for this. The latter are now mostly integrated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces and may not have the same level of autonomy in choosing where they fight, and in any case they have always portrayed Russia as the main enemy — dismissing the Kadyrov regime as little more than its puppets. Moreover, Chechens on both sides might want to avoid the blood feuds that direct clashes could produce, given that these would have repercussions not only for the fighters themselves, but also for their families back in Chechnya. In August 2022, Kadyrov cited blood feuds as an «effective tool for containing aggression and recklessness» between Chechens on both sides and threatened that pro-Ukrainian Chechens «will answer for their crimes» at the end of the war. For the most part, the displaced conflict between rival Chechen groups appears to have been more prevalent in their media than on the ground.
At the same time, in the early phases of the war, the kadyrovtsy contributed to Russian advances in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk, aiding Russia’s attritional strategy. From late 2022, however, their focus shifted to rear operations, including policing (and looting) the occupied territories, supporting Russian-installed local authorities, and providing border security. Their evolving role has in many ways mirrored that of other paramilitary groups: neither irrelevant nor as great as they claim. The kadyrovtsy often operated alongside Wagner and the militias of the people’s republics, and Kadyrov claimed 3,000 Wagner fighters transferred to Spetsnaz Akhmat as part of the dismantling of Wagner operations in Ukraine. The kadyrovtsy have also brought similar challenges to the overall coordination of Russian military operations. Kadyrov and Delimkhanov have publicly clashed with the leaders of the other paramilitary units, and an initial alliance between Kadyrov and Wagner owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin soon soured. The Ukrainian Resistance Centre claimed in January 2023 that rank-and-file members of the Russian military were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the preferential treatment given to both Wagner and the kadyrovtsy in the allocation of housing and equipment, and in January 2024 a Chechen commander clashed with military personnel at a checkpoint in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Senior kadyrovtsy are promoted on the basis of their loyalty to Groznyy, not Moscow. The kadyrovtsy also did little to hinder Ukraine’s incursion into Russia in August 2024, prompting criticism from Russia’s pro-war military blogger community and renewed questions about their effectiveness.
Equipment losses documented by the Oryx Project illustrate the ambiguities of Chechen involvement in the war. Chechen units have lost 44 Z-STS Akhmat armoured personnel carriers, accounting for nearly 8% of Russian losses for this vehicle class, but there are no recorded losses for many of the other vehicle types that have featured in their propaganda. This suggests that some equipment is more of a propaganda tool than a battlefield asset. The greatest personnel losses among Chechen units have been suffered by OMON Akhmat-1, Sever-Akhmat, and Spetsnaz Akhmat, whereas some of the newer equipment has been sported by SOBR Akhmat, offering indirect evidence of this.
Demonstrating loyalty at a lower cost
For Kadyrov, the war has provided an opportunity to reaffirm his loyalty and usefulness to Putin. Yet this has required a careful balancing act, weighing ostentatious support for the war against a desire to safeguard the core of the forces that are essential to his own regime’s survival. Although Kadyrov has publicly criticised the Ministry of Defence, his complaints remained within limits and, unlike Prigozhin, he never directly challenged Putin. The rudimentary training provided by the Russian University of Spetsnaz has allowed the Chechen authorities to claim credit for and support mobilisation, and Kadyrov and Alaudinov have both established themselves as spokespeople for the war, helping shape the narratives around the conflict.
When the war ends, Kadyrov is likely to emerge with a strengthened security service infrastructure. He will almost certainly resist any efforts to dismantle the new regular units because they offer extended influence and opportunities for enrichment. The future of Spetsnaz Akhmat is more uncertain: It could be maintained as another tool for the Chechen regime to project its influence, but it is just as likely to be dissolved and its Chechen personnel integrated into other units — something that could offset any losses caused by the war. Kadyrov will also likely seek to preserve the infrastructure in Chechnya that supports these units, and he will continue to leverage the kadyrovtsy for domestic propaganda.
This does not mean, however, that the Chechen regime will be more secure. From the outset, the Chechen authorities have struggled to recruit personnel to existing and new units. Across the North Caucasus, military service offers an opportunity for personal security and upward social mobility, and joining the kadyrovtsy has been a way for young Chechens to provide security and a livelihood. At the same time, the region has borne a disproportionate share of the recruitment burden and casualties of the war and the appeal of the kadyrovtsy has its limits — particularly when enlistments means participation in combat rather than parades. Kadyrov has sought to avoid a domestic backlash against the war, resisting Russia’s partial mobilisation within Chechnya itself; concealing losses from domestic audiences; and relying on forced conscription, the transfer of personnel between units, and the recruitment of non-Chechens to fill the shortfall in numbers and replenish losses. These recruitment issues are likely to continue. Nor is there any guarantee that even fully manned units will constitute an effective combat force. There has always been a gap between the carefully managed image of the kadyrovtsy and the operational realities — and this gap will persist beyond the current conflict.
