In recent months, relations between Baku and Moscow have experienced significant strain. The downward trend began with the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijani civilian plane, widely believed—supported by evidence—to have been shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile during its approach to Grozny. Since then, tensions have escalated with recurring incidents targeting each other’s interests, further deteriorating bilateral relations.
For instance, Azerbaijan has taken steps to curb Russian influence by closing the office of Rossotrudnichestvo’s «Russian House» in Baku, restricting or banning Russian state propaganda media, and arresting individuals perceived as pro-Russian. In response, Moscow has conducted cyberattacks on Azerbaijani government websites and employed traditional pressure tactics, such as targeting Azerbaijani labor migrants and small-scale business representatives within the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia. One notable incident involved an FSB-led raid in Yekaterinburg, reminiscent of 1990s-style bandit attacks, which resulted in the killing and arrests of several Azerbaijanis.
Both sides have utilized state media, parliamentarians, and government-affiliated experts to criticize one another, with high-level decision-makers refraining from official reactions for now. Notably, since December 2024, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia have not engaged in direct communication, at least publicly. Given the nature of both regimes and the historical context of Azerbaijan-Russia relations, direct leader-to-leader contact has traditionally been pivotal in shaping bilateral ties.
Most critically, high-level communication between the presidents appears to be at its lowest point or entirely absent in recent months. Tensions have been further exacerbated by statements from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), including a verbal note demanding the «immediate release of Russian journalists detained in Baku» after the arrests of Sputnik-Azerbaijan staff, whom Azerbaijani media identified as FSB officers. Azerbaijan, in turn, issued a protest via a note verbale, condemning the use of torture and degrading treatment by Russian law enforcement during interrogations of Azerbaijanis.
Parallel to the worsening relations with Russia, Azerbaijan has deepened cooperation with Türkiye, with intensified high-level communications and official visits between Baku, Brussels, and Washington. Additionally, there have been positive developments in peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan. Armenia’s efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union and normalize relations with Türkiye further contribute to the shifting regional dynamics. These developments are significant factors in the current state of Azerbaijan-Russia relations. However, the primary driver of Baku’s behavior toward Moscow—and the Kremlin’s cautious approach toward Baku—appears to be the changing balance of power in the region, a process that began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
In this article, we aim to explain the motivations behind Baku and Moscow’s actions amid the ongoing downturn in relations and explore potential trends in their future development.
Geopolitical Causes
Since 1991, Azerbaijan and Russia have not been strategic partners, despite recent rhetoric and agreements suggesting otherwise, nor have they been outright adversaries due to mutual cooperation needs. While Moscow has consistently sought to include Azerbaijan in its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Baku has maintained a policy of distancing itself from Russia, opting to balance relations with other global powers rather than aligning closely or bandwagoning with Moscow. Previously, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy balanced Russia and the West. However, due to changes in the international system and regional dynamics, Baku is recalibrating this balance. The declining Western presence in the region, Russia’s weakened position, China’s growing economic influence, and Türkiye’s strengthened role in the South Caucasus have prompted Azerbaijan to adjust its strategy. Baku now seeks to balance Russia with Türkiye, the West with Russia, Türkiye with China, and, to some extent, with Israel. These shifts currently favor Azerbaijan, bolstered by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.
Azerbaijan remains reluctant to join Western or Russian alliances, preferring to maintain beneficial relations with all major powers while avoiding formal alignment. However, sustaining this delicate balance is becoming increasingly challenging. Previously, Moscow leveraged the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to exert influence over both Baku and Yerevan.
However, after Azerbaijan restored control over all of Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, and Russian troops withdrew from the region, Moscow lost this leverage. Additionally, Russia’s role as a major arms exporter to Azerbaijan has significantly diminished, with other countries now supplying the Azerbaijani military.
Meanwhile, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s policy of distancing Yerevan from Moscow, normalizing relations with Türkiye, and pursuing a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan creates new opportunities for a regional security architecture that challenges Russia’s influence. A recent Russian MFA statement accused Western countries of attempting to limit Russia’s role in normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, while emphasizing Moscow’s support for normalization based on bilateral agreements from 2020 and 2022.
The 2020 trilateral ceasefire declaration between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia granted Russia control over a strategic transportation route connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory (the «Zangezur» or «Syunik» corridor). Although Baku has not officially rejected this agreement, the cancellation of a visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk to Azerbaijan—following attacks on Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg—is noteworthy. Overchuk oversees Russian projects related to the International North-South Transport Corridor and represents Russia in the trilateral commission tasked with unblocking regional communications, including the Zangezur corridor.
If Baku and Yerevan achieve a final peace agreement soon, it could enhance both countries’ relations with the West and strengthen Türkiye’s regional presence, a scenario Moscow dreads. Should pro-Russian political groups fail to gain power in Yerevan through elections or a coup, Moscow may shift its focus to Georgia, where relations with Russia have been improving, and Tbilisi no longer positions itself as the EU’s primary partner in the region.
Possible Developments in the Relationship
Russia’s remaining pressure tools on Azerbaijan include military intervention, targeting Azerbaijani labor migrants, and restricting imports of Azerbaijani agricultural products. While some Russian security elites may advocate for invading Azerbaijan to establish a «Russia-friendly» government, this scenario is unlikely due to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Türkiye’s support for Azerbaijan, and potential reactions from the United States and even China. Although Azerbaijan’s relations with the Biden administration were strained, Baku appears more aligned with the current Trump administration. Additionally, while China-Russia relations have strengthened, Beijing views the South Caucasus as an alternative route for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), independent of Moscow’s control.
The Kremlin likely recognizes the consequences of military intervention and may instead rely on economic pressure, such as targeting Azerbaijani labor migrants or imposing bans on agricultural imports. Such measures could create significant challenges for Baku, as Azerbaijan may struggle to provide jobs or business opportunities for millions of returning migrants, potentially fueling social and political unrest that could threaten the current regime. However, even in such a scenario, it is unlikely that pro-Russian leaders or groups would gain power in Azerbaijan. Russia’s historical image as an occupier, combined with its diminished soft power and the marginalization of pro-Russian officials in Azerbaijan, reduces Moscow’s influence. In a regime-change scenario, Türkiye’s influence would likely outweigh Russia’s.
If the Kremlin assesses the situation realistically, its goal is likely to pressure Baku to achieve specific concessions rather than pursue regime change. Moscow prefers stability over dealing with unpredictable leaders, as seen in past political crises in the former Soviet space.
The European Union is also increasing its involvement in the region, supporting peace negotiations between Baku and Yerevan and fostering cooperation with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Brussels encourages Yerevan’s efforts to deepen economic, political, and security ties with the EU while promoting economic cooperation and political stabilization with Baku. To strengthen its geoeconomic and geopolitical presence, the EU could encourage Baku to ease internal political pressure on independent media and NGOs, potentially allowing Azerbaijan to pursue «democratic normalization» on its own terms rather than under external pressure. Such developments could enhance EU-Azerbaijan cooperation and further weaken Russia’s regional influence.
Moreover, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy could expand cooperation with Armenia and, post-peace agreement, extend similar opportunities to Azerbaijan. A final peace between Baku and Yerevan could open alternative transport routes through Türkiye, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, providing the EU with secure access to the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and China, especially if relations with Georgia deteriorate or Russia’s presence there strengthens.
Considering the above, the most realistic trajectory for Azerbaijan-Russia relations is one of «not allies but partners for mutual benefits,» provided Russia avoids irrational decisions or strategic miscalculations.
