Since Poland and Romania joined NATO, both countries have been under the guarantee of the alliance’s collective security, enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. It seemed that this reliably protected them from external aggression. However, with the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the situation changed dramatically. Russia’s massive missile and drone attacks on Ukraine’s border regions took place in close proximity to the borders of Romania and Poland. Periodically, unmanned aerial vehicles crossed the border and fell on the territory of these countries. Sometimes this ended only with the discovery of debris, in some cases—with destruction and damage to buildings. A particularly severe episode was the fall of a missile in eastern Poland in November 2022, which claimed the lives of two people. The investigation showed that a Ukrainian air defense missile had accidentally entered Polish territory, launched to repel a massive shelling of Ukraine. At the same time, responsibility for the incident itself lies with Russia, since it was its missile strikes on Ukrainian territory that created the conditions that led to the tragedy. Despite such incidents, NATO adhered to a line of containing escalation. In public statements, it was emphasized that there were no signs of a deliberate attack on allies.
The War Begins — NATO’s Position
It should be noted that NATO’s position regarding the war in Ukraine was quite cautious both on the eve of and immediately after the Russian invasion. According to data from investigative journalist Bob Woodward, which he cites in his book «War,» already on February 23, 2022, US President Joe Biden authorized a decision by Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley to redeploy American ground and air units that were already in Europe to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—to the borders of Ukraine. This was intended to demonstrate to Vladimir Putin the US readiness to defend every inch of NATO territory.
The book also provides details of negotiations between US President Joe Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the night of February 23−24. The Ukrainian president refused to leave the country, emphasizing that he was staying in Kyiv, and appealed to Biden to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine. «We need to close the skies,» Zelenskyy said, pointing out that Ukrainian cities were subjected to massive airstrikes. Biden refused: introducing such a zone would mean that US or NATO aircraft would have to shoot down Russian air targets, which would be a direct escalation of the conflict.
In March 2022, similar requests from Zelenskyy were publicly rejected by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Stoltenberg explained on March 4: «The only way to enforce a no-fly zone is to send NATO fighter jets into Ukrainian airspace and then maintain it by shooting down Russian planes.» According to him, this would inevitably lead to the spread of the war beyond Ukraine, making it «even more dangerous and destructive and causing even more human suffering.» Therefore, NATO ruled out the possibility of sending ground forces or aviation to Ukrainian territory. This position was also confirmed by Blinken, emphasizing that Washington had no intention of entering into a war with Russia.
Thus, at that key moment, a strategy of avoiding direct military confrontation with Moscow was chosen—a course that the US and alliance member states continue to adhere to to this day.
Is Russia Escalating? Incidents Involving Russian Military Aircraft
Since the beginning of the full-scale war, Russia has increasingly resorted to aggressive interceptions against NATO reconnaissance aircraft and patrol aviation in international airspace over the Black Sea. A telling episode occurred on September 29, 2022: the British RC-135 Rivet Joint was escorted by two Su-27s, one of which «released a missile» near the aircraft. London assessed this as a technical malfunction, temporarily suspended flights over the region, and then resumed them under fighter cover, while emphasizing the legality of its missions in international airspace.
The most acute incident was the crash of the American MQ-9 Reaper drone on March 14, 2023. According to Pentagon data, one of the Russian Su-27s repeatedly dumped fuel on the drone, damaged its propeller, and forced it into an emergency ditching; Moscow denied contact. The US released video footage of the interception and called the actions of the Russian pilots «dangerous and unprofessional.» This was the first such direct episode of interaction between US and Russian Air Force military assets since the start of the invasion, showing how thin the line remains between «gray zone» pressure and open confrontation.
On May 7, 2023, a Russian Su-35 performed «aggressive and dangerous maneuvers» near a Polish L-410 aircraft conducting a Frontex mission in international airspace near Romania. According to the Polish side, the crew momentarily lost control due to the turbulence caused; after the incident, the EU and Romania condemned Russia’s behavior, and such patrol flights were temporarily suspended. The incident added to the picture of deliberate «psychological pressure» in the air outside the war in Ukraine but near NATO borders.
Taken together, these episodes demonstrate a consistent Russian pattern: attempting to «displace» NATO reconnaissance and patrol flights from Crimea and southern Ukraine through a combination of risky approaches, radio silence, and controversial «restricted zones,» while formally avoiding acknowledgment of intent to attack.
What to Do When Drones and Missiles Fall on NATO Member States’ Territories?
In NATO, procedures under Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty are built on consensus in the North Atlantic Council. If any member state believes that its territory, political independence, or security is threatened, it may invoke Article 4 and initiate consultations with NATO partners. These discussions themselves do not imply an automatic military response: this is a politico-diplomatic mechanism that allows for the exchange of intelligence data, coordination of joint monitoring and deterrence measures, and, if necessary, preparation of subsequent decisions. Historically, Article 4 has been applied sparingly (only a few times); the last widely recognized case was February 2022, when eight allies requested consultations after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
If it is established that an armed attack has occurred against an ally, the Council may unanimously recognize this and invoke Article 5. An attack on one is considered an attack on all, but the form of assistance is not predetermined: each member decides for itself what measures it «deems necessary» within the framework of the right to individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter—from military support to political and technical steps. Importantly, invoking Article 5 is not automatic and requires a collective assessment and decision by the allies. Throughout NATO’s existence, it has been formally activated only once—after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
In the end, the decision to activate the articles lies, first, with the country facing the threat and considering it sufficient to initiate consultations under Article 4. And then with the other NATO members supporting the actions of the first country and taking measures accordingly. Accordingly, the decision to invoke the articles is a matter of political will on the part of both the country facing the threat and its NATO partners.
Chronicle of Falls
From September 2023 to March 2025, at least twelve episodes of the fall or discovery of debris from Russian unmanned aerial vehicles were recorded on Romanian territory. The first incidents occurred on September 6, 9, and 13, 2023, in the Plauru area, and on December 14 of the same year, a crater from a drone strike was found in the Grindu area. In 2024, new cases occurred on March 29 (Tulcea County), July 25 and 31 (Plauru and Cetalköy), and October 4 (Danube Delta). In 2025, incidents became more frequent: on January 17, debris was discovered in two locations at once, new fragments were recorded on February 13−14, and on March 1, debris with remnants of explosives was found near the border with Moldova. All these episodes coincided with Russian attacks on Ukrainian Danube ports and were perceived as consequences of «overshoots» or drone falls during strikes.
In Poland, a series of incidents occurred in August and September 2025. On August 20, a drone fell in a cornfield near the settlement of Osini in Lublin Voivodeship, and on September 8−9, a crashed drone was discovered near the Terespol border crossing in the Polatychi area. The culmination came on the night of September 10, when several Russian drones crossed the Polish border at once: some of them were shot down by Polish forces and NATO allies, but no fewer than eight fell on the country’s territory. Residential buildings were also damaged, but there were no reports of casualties. Thus, over just three weeks, at least ten drone crash sites were recorded.
Moment of Truth — The November 15, 2022 Missile Incident in Eastern Poland
The first and so far only incident involving the loss of life on the territory of a NATO country as a result of Russia’s shelling of Ukraine was the fall of a Ukrainian air defense missile in the area of the Polish village of Przewodów.
Immediately after the incident, Polish Air Force fighters were scrambled, authorities increased the combat readiness of certain units, and the media and political circles actively discussed whether consultations within NATO should be initiated. The Polish Foreign Ministry stated that a Russian-made missile had fallen on the country’s territory and summoned the Russian ambassador. However, President Andrzej Duda soon emphasized that there was no evidence of a deliberate attack and suggested that the missile might have been part of the Ukrainian air defense system that activated in response to massive Russian strikes on Ukraine.
In these circumstances, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki expressed doubt about the need to invoke Article 4, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed the preliminary conclusions: this was not an attack on Poland, but a tragic incident. The US and other allies also supported this position, while simultaneously placing political responsibility on Russia, since it was its massive shelling of Ukrainian cities that led to the missile’s fall.
On November 22, 2022, Russian pranksters published a recording of a phone conversation with Polish President Andrzej Duda, made shortly after the missile fell on Polish territory. The pranksters impersonated French President Emmanuel Macron and questioned the Polish president in detail about his actions in connection with the incident. Subsequently, the Polish side acknowledged the prank and did not refute the fact of the conversation or the president’s participation in it.
In the conversation with the pranksters, the Polish president quite clearly outlined his position: «Do you think I want war with Russia? Believe me, I don’t want that. I don’t want war with Russia and, believe me, I am extremely cautious, extremely cautious,» he said. «I’m only talking about Article 4, I’m not talking about Article 5,» the president added, referring to the treaty clause under which an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all.
As is known, after the tragic incident, Article 4 was not invoked. Moreover, the day after the incident, President Biden stated that it was unlikely that the missile that fell in Poland was launched by Russia.
Current Situation and Prospects
Despite the presence of American and European military personnel in NATO countries bordering Russia and Ukraine, as well as the strengthening of their contingents and levels of combat readiness, both individual states and the alliance as a whole have consistently avoided scenarios of direct confrontation with Moscow. Even in cases where the grounds for invoking NATO mechanisms were obvious—missile and drone falls on allied territory, the deaths of people in Poland in November 2022—decisions to activate Article 4 or, even more so, Article 5 were not made. This is explained by the fact that invoking the key articles of the Washington Treaty is not automatic: it always remains the result of political decisions at the national level and the consensus of all alliance participants.
At the center of everything is the question of the political assessment of what happened. Both Romania and Poland could interpret the incursions of Russian drones in different ways—from accidental incidents, as they did, to defining a threat—which, in general, is also logical, given the military purpose of the drones and the explosions they cause. However, no change in assessment has occurred over this time. The experience of recent years shows that from February 2022 to the present, the strategy of avoiding escalation at any cost has dominated among NATO countries, especially on the eastern flank. It seems that this line will continue.
