Not even a decade has passed since the Kremlin’s «triumphant return» to the Middle East following Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 turned out to be, to use the euphemistic language of the war against Ukraine, another «regrouping». Contrary to Vladimir Putin’s assertion that the rapid fall of Damascus was not a «defeat for Russia», which had supposedly achieved its abstract anti-terrorist «goal» in Syria, the collapse of the Assad regime is certainly a serious blow to the country’s military and political status not only in the Middle East but also far beyond.
We can argue all we want about the common autocratic traits of Russian and Middle Eastern elites that allow them to deepen official ties, circumvent sanctions, and increase economic cooperation, but it is the long-term presence of official military facilities in the Mediterranean Sea — in close proximity to the oil-rich Suez Canal — that has provided Moscow with the ability to garner support and serve as a real, not perceived, counterweight to the U.S. presence in the region. The Kremlin’s current anti-crisis reliance on its former assets in Libya is a temporary and adaptive move, and increased support for the Houthis in Yemen will provoke resistance primarily among Russia’s partners, not opponents. In this respect, Trump’s arrival in the White House with his controversial Middle East agenda is not so interesting for the Kremlin (except, of course, whatever Trump intends to do about Ukraine), since Russia does not have many serious instruments in the region, and its rhetorical references to «diplomatic concerns» alone will not force others to talk to the Kremlin on equal terms.
Covering up what happened
It is understandable that the Kremlin, with its habit of denying any negative events, is trying to mitigate the current uncertainty surrounding the Khmeimim air base in Latakia and (the naval base in Tartus): it pretends that it is still considering what to do with its bases in Syria, amid allegedly numerous requests to stay. But no matter how deeply pro-Kremlin political analysts like Fyodor Lukyanov try to justify why Russia can’t just «up and leave», Putin’s cautious rhetoric about seeking consensus with the new authorities in Damascus is evidence of an attempt to save face and get a reprieve on the evacuation of military equipment.
Arguments about the need to revise Putin’s own strategy after the incident (in Lukyanov’s words, «redefining Russia’s positions in the region» or «adjusting relations with certain countries») still look like techniques of complacency in the face of yet another failure by intelligence and army officials who have long and firmly kept diplomats away from making real foreign policy decisions.
It is worth explaining why this strike is not only a blow to Russia’s image, but also an actual blow. Since the first months of the Syrian campaign, the Ministry of Defence has been busy not only bombing the opposition under the guise of fighting ISIS, but also strengthening the local infrastructure for the long-term deployment of the Russian contingent. In Russia’s military planning, Syria has become the «long arm» of the Southern Military District and a springboard for projecting power in the region, primarily through the deployment of Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and MiG-31 fast interceptor fighters with long-range missiles.
The modest composition of the Mediterranean squadron, dictated by the lack of long-range naval vessels in the Russian fleet and exacerbated by Turkey’s rotation-limiting ban on warships passing through the Black Sea straits, has somehow made it possible to maintain a group of submarines and surface ships on alert and to conduct deterrence operations against US aircraft carrier groups. This is really important for the Russian General Staff, because since the times of the Cold War the eastern part of the vast Mediterranean basin has been seen within American military planning as a convenient platform for a hypothetical attack on south-central Russia using aircraft carriers and «Tomahawk» cruise missiles.
Now Russia has lost this opportunity. Judging by open data, despite the deployment of three large landing ships (these are Alexander Shabalin, Ivan Gren and Alexander Otrakovsky) to Syria to evacuate equipment and the recent sabotage of the MV Ursa Major heavy-lift ship (it was sank by three explosions) the supreme commander of the navy has not bothered to create a serious underwater veil to cover them. For example, the B-261 Novorossiysk diesel-electric attack submarine, which was the only submarine operating in the region, has been withdrawn from the water and is now probably on its way to the Leningrad naval base.
Moreover, there are serious doubts that Russian negotiators will be able to agree in 2025 that Russia can continue to use the former military facilities as a hub to support logistical operations on the African continent. By January 2025, virtually all the air defense and radar capabilities needed to keep a military facility operational at the Khmeimim air base and the port of Tartus will have been withdrawn. In addition, all bases are under fire control from commanding heights, which does not rule out the possibility of sabotage by «random sniper groups» against Russian military transport or even civilian aircraft at some point.
For security reasons alone, it seems untenable that propagandist Eugene Satanovsky’s assumption that Turkey, which is interested in realizing a joint gas hub project with Russia in 2025−2026, can help Moscow maintain logistics to Africa. Given that Ankara has formally distanced itself from the new Syrian authorities, it may well be able to «kill two birds with one stone»: reap the benefits from mediating the haggling over Russian bases, which nobody in the region wants, and implement the hub, which Moscow also needs.
Besides, there are enough people in the region who are unhappy with Russia’s policy in Africa, including its one-sided support for military juntas, and who are well aware of the real tonnage of humanitarian aid that Moscow has sent to Syria over the years, and just whose grain it was (Ukraine’s) that Russian companies have imported to Syria in recent years.
Libya as a backup plan
Moscow is still trying to adapt to the new conditions by transferring military equipment from Syria or Russia (bypassing Turkish airspace) to the Libyan air bases at Al-Hadim and Jufra. In other words, the Kremlin is trying to make use of assets acquired in the region during the years of its military presence in Syria. It is no secret that Moscow’s erratic policy in Libya has seen it variously increase its support for Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA), only to balance it with dialogue with their opponents, the internationally recognized authorities in Tripoli. This support was provided primarily through the wayward Yevgeny Prigozhin and his PMC «Wagner». This support included, firstly, the supply of equipment, which was airlifted to Libya from Khmeimim Airbase. In this way, mobile, ground-based, electronic warfare (EW) system «Krasukha», towed self-propelled towed howitzer gun «Msta-B», armored vehicles «Tiger» and «Ural», SAMPK «Pantsir-S1» based on the KamAZ-6560, both from the available arsenal of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and on lease from Assad’s forces, as well as Syrian MiG-29 fighter jets, which were replaced by Russian ones in the Syrian Air Force — in order to hide the supplies and confuse the tracks — were delivered. Second, after a sustainable ceasefire was reached in Syria, Syrian volunteers were recruited and sent to Libya via the Khmeimim-Bengazi route. Thirdly, since May 2016, Russia’s JSC Goznak has manufactured more than 14 billion dinars for the LNA, allowing Haftar to triple the military’s salaries and launch an operation to capture Tripoli, which ended in failure. These manipulations have led to an increasing devaluation of the dinar, aided by Haftar himself, whose family has recently acquired its own printing machine enabling it to print money. The introduction into circulation and use of currency is handled by the parallel Central bank in Benghazi, which is controlled by Haftar, without disclosure or oversight.
After Prigozhin’s mutiny and his «march towards Moscow», the Kremlin managed, not without some difficulty, to replace the «Wagner» units in Libya with a contingent of the African Corps controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense, which included sending several dozen T-72 tanks for the needs of the LNA through the port of Tobruk under the pretext of conducting exercises. In reality, however, these are shadow operations: all these years, the Russian power wing has been unable or unwilling to push for even formal agreements in eastern Libya that would give the Russians at least some status as military instructors and separate them from Sudanese or Chadian mercenaries.
22 June 2023 marked the end of the transition period set by the UN as a result of the Geneva Accords, by the end of which Libya was supposed to have an elected president and parliament. Local elite groups are not interested in elections and real consolidation of power, as each side fears losing its position in a possible plebiscite, which could lead to a resumption of civil war.
Russia will not be able to open an official base in today’s Libya: it will not gain legitimacy because it requires a consensus between the West and the East to be approved for such a move. For example, Tripoli has refused to allow Turkey to lease a port for a military base, despite the presence of the military and Ankara’s numerous economic projects, including those affiliated with or linked to European business.
In a sense, the current retreat into the Libyan «grey zone» is even beneficial for Russia, as the preservation of dual power in the country will allow Russia to continue its logistical operations in Africa. There is, however, a catch, or rather, several catches. First, Russia’s excessive military activity in eastern Libya could lead to a scandal at the UN for violating the arms embargo on that country. Second, the Kremlin’s ability to conduct operations in this state will be limited: they may have an impact and even influence any negotiations, but each time Moscow will either have to invent a new explanation or resort to the old rhetoric of «Ikhtamnyet»: «they [i.e. our people] are not there». Third, the ability of transport planes to quickly move heavy cargo to Africa via Libya is limited by the length of the route: military equipment will have to be transported by sea, which increases the response time to events in African countries, where coups often happen overnight. Moscow will have to develop a network of secure backup routes, with the possibility of renting sites in other countries, such as Tunisia.
Reliance on Iran
Having found themselves in the same deep «sanctions ditch» after 2022, Russia and Iran are expanding their interaction. A strategic agreement between Moscow and Tehran is expected to be signed in mid-January 2025, which the parties have been postponing for more than a year for one reason or another. The Iranian decision to allow the Russian military to buy and then franchise its own production of «kamikaze drones» has played a significant role in bringing the two countries closer together. For the first time in the history of bilateral relations, the Iranians found themselves training the Russian military, rather than being trained by it: Iranian specialists had to set up the process on the ground for the Russians to use «kamikaze» and repeater drones. Limited means of destruction and the high cost of domestically produced missiles led to Moscow’s likely purchase of Iranian Arman and Fath-360 missile systems, which were spotted in the port of Bandar-e Anzeli in early January 2025.
The strategic agreement can hardly be described as a document whose implementation will lead to the intensification of comprehensive cooperation at all levels as it is rather declarative in nature. However, Iran’s support for thousands of artillery pieces as an alternative to Russian precision weapons, which are in short supply in the context of the large Ukrainian front, somehow has its price, which the Kremlin will have to pay to a partner that demands that its interests be taken into account. Thus, in 2023, after a statement following the Russia-UAE summit in which Russia sided with the UAE in the territorial dispute between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, Iranian diplomacy made it clear that it would no longer tolerate such actions and demanded compensation for the damage done to bilateral relations.
The two sides remain interdependent on a number of economic and political issues. Iran expects Russia to support it on various platforms, notably the UN Security Council, as it continues to strengthen its nuclear capabilities. However, the most important issue for bilateral relations in 2025 may be Moscow’s real support in the event of further military escalation along the Israeli-Iranian line. The Israelis have already achieved unprecedented success in destroying the Iranian Axis of Resistance. Emboldened by this success, and possibly supported by the Trump administration, they may continue to press Tehran to dismantle the facilities of its nuclear program. The expected delivery of Russian Su-35 fighter jets and their operation by the Iranian air force could give local engineers the competence to build their own aircraft but will not make a difference in repelling a hypothetical Israeli strike.
It is possible that the Trump administration will take an extremely cautious approach to pressuring Iran. For example, it might prefer to fight it loudly and demonstratively in Yemen, where Iranian support is relatively minimal, and actually organize negotiations with President Masoud Pezeshkian in the earlier North Korea scenario. Iran’s struggle against American hegemony is similar to Russia’s: local elites, for all their formidable rhetoric, look carefully at the West where they keep their private assets and wait for an opportunity to get a good «deal».
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First, by intervening in the Syrian war Russia tried to get Washington to talk to it on an «equal footing» about Ukraine after the introduction of sanctions in 2014. It then worked hard to get regional actors across the Middle East to take into account its wishes and vision of a «just world order». By 2025, however, Russia finds itself in a position where Syria can no longer be used a bargaining chip in the upcoming negotiations with Trump, and the country’s meagre economic and now military capabilities reinforce its drift away from the main trends in the Middle East arena. The attempt to use the Libyan bridgehead to consolidate its previous positions in both the Middle East and Africa is limited in scope: it will allow Russia to conduct operations in the so-called «grey zone» and occasionally shift the focus of its own foreign and domestic policy away from Ukraine. However, this level of activity is more characteristic of quasi-state actors and proxy forces than of a country that so persistently seeks to demonstrate its status as a world power «by tongue, pen and sword».
