President Vladimir Putin has made it clear in public statements leading up to the summer fighting that breaking the Ukrainian army and seizing more territory remain the primary goals of Russian forces. In March 2025, he claimed that Russia «has the strategic initiative across the entire front» and expressed confidence, stating he had «reason to believe we can finish them off.» He based this assertion on the Russian army’s «daily territorial gains».
To be sure, the Russian army is capturing small tactical objectives daily. However, there has been no operational or strategic breakthrough of Ukrainian defensive lines. Russian military leadership appeared to envision a collapse of Ukrainian positions as operations expanded into Sumy Oblast and across the front. Yet, comparing Russian objectives at the beginning of May to their positions at the start of September, it is evident that the Russian army has failed to capture any cities of operational significance or decisively break the Ukrainian army in the manner seen in the First and Second World Wars.
Key differences distinguish the prepared major offensives of the First and Second World Wars from Russian operations in 2025. Rather than a major offensive starting in June, as seen with the Russian Imperial Army in 1916 or the massive Soviet offensive in June 1944, the Russian army has continued a slow, grinding campaign that began earlier in the year. Unlike the well-planned, full-front offensives of the world wars, the 2025 summer fighting season, which began in May, is better described as a continuation of smaller military operations already underway.
The best-case scenario for the Russian army this summer would have been a significant breakdown of Ukraine’s defensive lines through attrition. Russia aims to erode the Ukrainian army’s will and capacity to fight by leveraging its numerical superiority to attack multiple fronts consistently and relentlessly. The hope is that Ukraine, with its smaller population, will face a crisis and collapse.
Sumy Offensive
The push into Sumy Oblast exemplifies Russia’s summer fighting season. What began as a promising advance, with several villages captured in a matter of days, quickly bogged down. Some of Russia’s most elite formations were involved, including the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, units of the 83rd VDV (Airborne Forces), and up to three regiments of the elite 76th VDV Division. Other units, such as the 11th VDV Brigade, which fought at Bakhmut and other locations, were also deployed. Some of these elite units were pre-positioned along the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border, suggesting Russian military leadership believed these troops were capable of leading a successful offensive.
After pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in March and April, the Russian army followed up in May by crossing the border into Sumy Oblast. Given the short timeframe, this decision likely stemmed from a belief that Ukrainian forces were weakened, presenting an opportunity for a breakthrough, and that the interval between April and May was sufficient to replenish units after the fighting in Kursk Oblast.
Sumy is the closest oblast capital to Russia’s 1991 borders, approximately 36 kilometers from the city center to the Russian border, similar to the distance between central Kharkiv and Russia. As of this writing, Russian troops at their forward-most positions remain 25 kilometers from Sumy’s city center. Capturing or even threatening Sumy would be a significant political achievement and a potentially easier target than the heavily fortified Zaporizhzhia or Kherson.
In Sumy Oblast, Russia’s elite formations successfully captured border villages, but the offensive was far smaller in scale and scope compared to the massive invasion across the border in February 2022. Since early summer, Russian forces have made no significant territorial gains despite heavy fighting along the Kursk-Sumy border. According to the Ukrainian source DeepState, no more than eight Russian regiments and brigades were engaged in this area as of late August.
Southern Donetsk
In contrast to Sumy Oblast, Russian forces made their most significant gains of the summer in Donetsk, particularly in the southern half of the oblast. From early May, Russian forces successfully crossed the T0504 road between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk, which became the focal point of their summer advances. Meter by meter and treeline by treeline, the Russian army made slow but steady progress, forming a bulge on the flanks of both Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka.
Capturing Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka will likely be challenging for Russian forces. In mid-July, Russian troops near Pokrovsk told RIA Novosti that the area south of the city was well fortified. Since then, Russian forces have pushed to the city’s flanks, threatening its supply lines. Ukrainian media have described the situation in Pokrovsk as «critical» in recent weeks. In Kostiantynivka, the city remains under constant bombardment, but its immediate outskirts are under better control than those of Pokrovsk. Russian forces appear to be avoiding bloody, Stalingrad-like urban battles, such as those seen in Toretsk. By late August, up to 20 Russian regiments and brigades were attempting to encircle Pokrovsk, with a less clear number of forces near Kostiantynivka.
While Ukrainian forces in Donetsk focused on containing this slow but persistent offensive, Russian forces expanded and closed several gaps in the line. They simultaneously advanced approximately 10 kilometers down the H20 highway south of Kostiantynivka and finally took control of Toretsk. Toretsk had served as an attrition point to weaken the Russian army south of Kostiantynivka, with Ukraine deploying key elements of the battle-hardened Azov formation to hold the line there throughout spring 2025. Since the fall of Toretsk, at least some Azov units have been tasked with containing the salient between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka.
In southwestern Donbas, Russian forces spent four months pushing through small towns and villages toward the borders of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. At the beginning of May, the frontage here spanned approximately 70 kilometers, expanding to over 80 kilometers by the end of August. Russian forces advanced roughly 30 kilometers along the narrow N15 highway connecting Donetsk to Zaporizhzhia. Elsewhere, they gained only five to ten kilometers. Number of Russian regiments and brigades in this area dropped significantly from 21 in early May to about seven on the line of contact by late August 2025 suggesting either heavy losses requiring consolidation or the redeployment of troops to other fronts.
Northern Donetsk and Kharkiv
North of the major battles, the Russian army attempted to reclaim territory lost in 2022. In late August, Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River near Zarichne, the last settlement east of Lyman. Lyman, a tactically important logistics hub near Slovyansk, saw intense fighting in May 2022. Russian forces were expelled from the city in autumn 2022, losing their forward positions northeast of Slovyansk. Lyman may become a focal point again in the coming months, as it could serve as a launchpad for strikes on Ukrainian supply lines supporting troops near Kostiantynivka.
Future fighting in the area will see Russian troops better positioned logistically and with arguably more secure flanks than in 2022, when undermanned Russian units were overrun by Ukrainian forces, prompting Putin to announce partial mobilization. The late summer attacks near Lyman suggest more forceful Russian action in late 2025 and early 2026, potentially aimed at flanking the remaining major Ukrainian population centers in Donetsk Oblast.
In winter 2025, Russian forces crossed parts of the Oskil River near Kupyansk, which they also lost in 2022. Since then, Russian troops have been pressuring the city to recapture it. Taking Kupyansk, or at least exerting intense pressure on it, could force Ukraine to reconsider whether holding positions east of the Oskil River, such as in Petropavlivka and other settlements, is sustainable. Logistically starving Ukrainian troops east of the Oskil would free up Russian forces for further offensives into Kharkiv Oblast or other parts of the front.
Is the Russian Army Learning?
Some Russian military officers are aware of their shortcomings in conducting large-scale operations, and discussions on addressing these issues are occurring, at least somewhat openly. Official Russian military journals, through the lens of historical lessons, critique the current ability of the armed forces to plan and execute operations. One area of focus is the need for better officer training to use troops more effectively.
The war’s defensive nature, favoring static positions over offensive actions, remains unchanged. The Russian army has not solved the challenges posed by drones or constant surveillance of their troop positions. Open-source data, reveals which formations are fighting on specific fronts. This complicates the type of warfare the Soviet and now Russian army has trained for since the 1940s. Attempts to concentrate forces for an assault can be detected and targeted with missiles and drones before reaching the line of contact. The inability of armored columns to advance has shifted the burden to small infantry groups, increasingly using motorcycles.
Russian military thinkers were discussing these issues before the war began. In January 2022, the Ministry of Defense journal Voennaya Mysl published an article on the changing character of war, noting that the proliferation of precision strike weapons makes «large localized groups with a high density of forces and assets … not only inappropriate, but also extremely dangerous.» Whether Russia can develop new operational concepts will be critical to determining if Putin can achieve his goal of breaking the Ukrainian army and subjugating the country by force.
What’s Next?
Looking ahead, the war’s outcome will hinge on attrition. Both Russia and Ukraine face severe challenges with personnel and equipment. Ukraine struggles with a shortage of frontline infantry and uncertainty about the level of continued Western support. Russia’s relentless attacks have resulted in, by conservative estimates, over 126,000 deaths, likely higher.
The summer fighting saw significant tactical gains for the Russian army but no operational or strategic breakthroughs that shifted the war’s tide. Entering late 2025 and early 2026, the number of formations committed and Kremlin statements indicate that seizing control of Donetsk Oblast’s remaining population centers is the primary goal. Doing so would provide Russia with greater leverage in any future settlement. More importantly, control over Donetsk, fortified for over a decade, would enable Russian forces to launch deeper attacks into other Ukrainian oblasts.
