Early parliamentary elections have concluded in Germany. As expected, though not overwhelmingly, the conservative CDU/CSU bloc, led by Friedrich Merz, emerged victorious. The new Bundestag of the 21st convocation will include four other parties: the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Left Party. It is already clear that the far-right and far-left flanks of German politics will not be part of the future government. The most likely scenario is the revival of a grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD, a format that was highly popular under Angela Merkel. Initial exploratory talks have already begun. What will the new parliamentary majority’s policy be toward Ukraine and Russia?
CDU: «Do Not Confuse the Aggressor with the Victim!»
Following the breakdown of negotiations in the White House between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the U.S. administration, represented by Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, the conservative leader and potential future chancellor Friedrich Merz promptly posted on his X account: «We stand with Ukraine in good times and bad. In this terrible war, one must never confuse the aggressor with the victim!» With this statement, Merz reaffirmed his commitment to a pro-Ukrainian course for the country he is poised to lead. An analysis of his past statements—including during his time out of «big politics» following a conflict with then-Federal Chancellor and CDU leader Angela Merkel—leads to an unequivocal conclusion: a «pro-Russian pivot» from Merz is not to be expected. Notably, during his «exile,» he sometimes outpaced active politicians in his stance. For instance, in early March 2014, when official Berlin was still wavering on the right strategy, Merz called economic sanctions against Russia and its exclusion from the G8 «possible and conceivable.» Two factors stand out here. First, these remarks were not made in a routine interview but in a «guest article,» a special format in which leading German newspapers (in this case, Handelsblatt) offer politicians a platform for programmatic statements. Second, Merz identified himself in the piece as the chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, Germany’s most influential transatlantic public organization.
Over the subsequent decade, Merz gave no reason to doubt the consistency of his position. During the 2024 election campaign, he went as far as proposing an ultimatum to Moscow: if Russia did not cease bombing residential areas in Ukraine within 24 hours, Germany would supply Taurus missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Although his rhetoric softened somewhat after the election victory (on the Taurus issue, he avoided direct answers, reverting to typically German political phrasing about «cooperation with the EU» and «preventing Germany’s involvement in the war»), the overarching direction of his foreign policy remains pro-Ukrainian and critical of Russia.
Merz’s stance is shared by other key CDU figures. Bundestag deputy Thorsten Frei, who is highly likely to secure a significant ministerial post in the future government, responded to a voter’s question about potentially lifting sanctions against Russia by noting that «Russia continues to bomb civilian targets daily and violate international law in Ukraine,» calling any rollback of sanctions «entirely the wrong signal.» Felor Badenberg, a former deputy head of Germany’s domestic intelligence service (BfV) and currently a state minister (senator) in Berlin—who is also likely to join the federal government under the CDU quota—consistently criticizes Russian espionage and disinformation campaigns, advocating for harsher criminal penalties for German residents abetting such activities. Finally, Roderich Kiesewetter, a leading CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesperson and the faction’s rapporteur on international affairs in the parliamentary committee, is known for his steadfast pro-Ukrainian stance. He is among the few German politicians who, instead of the vague formula «Ukraine must not lose,» openly assert that Russia must lose the war.
SPD: «Ukraine Is a Sovereign Democratic Country That Has Chosen to Join the EU Family»
The Social Democrats were once frequently accused of excessive concessions to Russia, with critics pointing to the «friendship» between former chancellor and party leader Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin, as well as the statements and actions of other SPD members. Contrary to skeptics’ expectations, Olaf Scholz and his government unequivocally backed Kyiv from the very first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The SPD—albeit after months of debate—gradually agreed to supply Ukraine with various types of weapons, from tanks and armored vehicles to rocket systems and air defense equipment. Between February 2022 and February 2025, the federal government, led by centrists, provided Ukraine with over € 43.5 billion in combined military, financial, humanitarian, and logistical aid, with Scholz repeatedly condemning Russian aggression and pledging to support Kyiv for as long as necessary. The outgoing chancellor was explicit about the recent White House scandal: he expressed support for Zelensky, criticized Trump and Vance, emphasized the need for Ukraine and the EU to be part of the negotiation process, and rejected the Kremlin’s plans to install a pro-Russian government in Ukraine «dancing to Russia’s tune.»
Among other Social Democrats, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stands out for his firm stance. Once considered a potential successor to Scholz as chancellor candidate, Pistorius will join the next government if the CDU/CSU and SPD reach an agreement. He views Russia as a «threat» to Germany and believes it will remain «the greatest security threat in Europe for the foreseeable future.» His widely quoted remark—”We must be capable of waging war by 2029″ (referring to a potential Russian attack)—was made during a so-called «government hour,» when ministers publicly report to parliament in a live broadcast. Prominent SPD colleagues share similar views, though they express them less bluntly. Lars Klingbeil, SPD co-chair and recently elected parliamentary faction leader, published a programmatic article in October 2022 in the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s IPG journal, close to the SPD, acknowledging the fundamental flaws of Germany’s «change through rapprochement» policy toward Russia, unequivocally condemning Kremlin aggression, and concluding: «The peace we knew before February 24 no longer exists.» Days before the election, Klingbeil noted: «We have no fear of Putin, but we don’t know what further escalation he’s capable of.»
What Specifically?
The conservatives and Social Democrats differ on a range of issues, from migration and healthcare to labor market reforms and taxation. Yet, on key foreign policy matters, their views align closely. This shared foundation—anti-Trump sentiment, Euro-optimism and a desire to strengthen Europe’s role, support for Ukraine as a victim of aggression, condemnation of Russia’s actions, and a drive to build a new, effective continental security architecture—combined with a sense of responsibility for their country’s future, will likely enable them to form a coalition. The new government will command 328 of the Bundestag’s 630 seats (a minimum of 316 is needed for a majority). Nearly all foreign policy initiatives related to aiding Ukraine and curbing Russia will secure the Greens’ backing (an additional 85 seats), ensuring the executive and legislative branches can maintain their current course on Ukraine and Russia. Support from the Left Party is also possible on some issues, particularly those beyond military matters. Having unexpectedly garnered significant voter support, the Left—after the departure of Sahra Wagenknecht’s faction and a leadership change—shifted from its «non-interventionist» and anti-Western stance, finding the resolve to label Russia an «aggressor» and expressing readiness to «help secure a two-thirds majority for meaningful proposals.» Their red line remains weapons deliveries. This prompted Merz to call an extraordinary Bundestag session to push through key projects requiring a constitutional majority in the current parliament, including establishing a special defense fund.
Thus, there is no basis to suggest the new cabinet will seek rapprochement with Moscow, lift sanctions against Russia (sectoral or personal), or halt aid to Ukraine. Nor will there be a return to large-scale economic cooperation with Russia. The two parties advocating such a course—the far-right AfD and the far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance—lack the leverage to influence the future government. However, while Germany can pursue an independent sanctions policy toward Russia, increasing military aid to Ukraine cannot be achieved with a single stroke of Merz’s pen. The «black-red» coalition will need to balance real financial and industrial capacities, public sentiment, and the positions of other influential EU countries.
