Several strategic interests of Russia and Iran are aligning as both countries face deteriorating relations with the West, increased sanctions and weakened positions in the Middle East. Both countries are seeking to regain initiative by expanding their economic, political, and military cooperation. The latest milestone for both countries is 2025’s comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. But how comprehensive will this prove to be?
A history of fluctuation
Historically, Russia and Iran’s relations have fluctuated drastically between cooperation and conflicts. Over the centuries, key tensions stemmed from territorial disputes and ideological differences. While they cooperated against the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century to the some extent, later Russia and Persia fought against each other over the control of the South Caucasus in the 19th century. Then, they were adversaries during the early Soviet Union and in the 1940s the USSR even invaded Azerbaijani region of Iran for some period and Moscow pressured on Tehran for participation in Iranian oil consortium in 1940s and 50s. After the Iranian Revolution in 1978−79, relations between two countries also were not good either. The Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini even called the Soviet Union the «Lesser Satan» because of its atheistic communist ideology, with Moscow supporting Iraq during the first years of the Iraq-Iran war (only later did Moscow also sell equipment to Iran.) By 1989 relations between two countries were normalized at least; between 1989−1991, four major intergovernmental agreements in the field of military-technical cooperation were signed between the USSR and Iran for a total of 5.1 billion dollars [there are other reported numbers regarding the total cost], turning Iran in the following years into one of the main recipients of Soviet weapons. Moscow also agreed to help Iran to complete its nuclear reactor in Bushehr. The incomplete fulfillment of these contracts, however, was a consequence of the rapprochement between Russia and the United States — the Russian-American Gore-Chernomyrdin agreements of June 30, 1995. After this major setback, Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation only resumed several years later. And by 2000−2007, Russia became the main supplier of weapons to Iran (about 85% of the country’s total military imports). Iran took third place among the largest recipients of Russian weapons, with the total volume of deliveries amounting to $ 1.96 billion (5.4% of the total volume of Russian military exports).
But yet again, in the mid-2000s, Moscow bargained with the West over relations with Iran and delays again cropped up with the completion of the Bushehr reactor. The same went for the deployments of S 300 air defense systems (reportedly, the value of the contract was more than $ 800 million.) This challenged the relations between Iran and Russia. However, finally in 2015 Moscow lifted the ban on deliveries of S-300 to Iran.
All told, Moscow and Tehran did establish a track record of regional security cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s Russia and Iran both supported the Northen Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan On top of that, Moscow and Tehran cooperated on the negotiations on Tajikistan at the same time. Similarly, Moscow and Tehran initiated the adoption by the Caspian states of an obligation to prevent a foreign military presence in the region or new bases of other states on their territory in 2018. However, only Iran among the Caspian countries has not ratified the document to date. A decision was made to accelerate work on coordinating the draft agreement on the methodology for establishing direct baselines in the Caspian Sea, which Iran particularly insists on due to the offshore resources of the Caspian southern coast, as well as on completing negotiations on the preparation of a five-party agreement on confidence-building in the field of military activities in the Caspian Sea.
After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the economic and strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran experienced an unprecedented uptick. Russia is reportedly considering increasing its military support to Iran by providing advanced weaponry, which could significantly boost the Iranian military capabilities in the region. Iran’s sending of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine could be a strategic move in exchange for more advanced weapons, including modern anti-ship missiles, advanced air defense systems, and the Su-35 fighter jets that Iran has long been waiting for. Iran also hopes to receive S-400 air defense systems to combat the Israeli Air Force. If it happens, the military power of Iran in the region may be strengthened, which is a concern not only for Israel but for Saudi Arabia too.
Geoeconomics of the relations
Besides strategic cooperation, after 2022 Iran was also an important partner for Russia’s weakened economy. It is especially important for Russia’s access to the Gulf and East Asian countries, and it is the transit route — the International North-South Transport Corridor — which is considered by Moscow as a vital for the development of its trade with the Global South. However, it is fraught with complex risks and divergent geopolitical interests.
Despite Western sanctions, Russia-Iranian trade and economic relations reportedly continue to develop in areas like nuclear and thermal energy, mechanical engineering, transportation, oil and natural gas, and agriculture. However, trade volumes between the two have not scaled up substantially. In fact, trade turnover between Russia and Iran in 2023 decreased by 17.3%, to $ 4 billion (the total volume of exports from Russia, amounted to $ 2.7 billion, from Iran — $ 1.3 billion). However, in the first 10 months of 2024 there was 15.5 percent growth. The efforts of the parties over the last years have not solved the basic problems of Russian exports — its structure has remained unchanged, and its volumes are unstable. At the same time, Iranian goods are expanding their presence on the Russian market.
Crucially, Moscow and Tehran want to cooperate in the export of Russian natural gas to Iran. The gas pipelines pass through the territories of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In this respect, there could be headwinds from recently signed strategic partnerships between Armenia and the United States, the strengthening ties between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. This could all complicate Tehran and Moscow’s plans for the INSTC and energy projects development in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement
Between 2001 and 2024 the relations between two states are guided by the provisions of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Relations and Principles of Cooperation between Russia and Iran of 2001. It was concluded for 10 years and was automatically extended for subsequent five-year periods. Preparation of the new document began after the visit to Moscow in January 2022 of Iranian President.
The new Russian-Iranian treaty, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, has been concluded for 20 years. The agreement covers all areas of bilateral relations, including millitary, security, counterterrorism, energy, finance, transport, information, industry, agriculture, culture, science and technology. But the agreement will subsequently allow for the conclusion of other agreements to address more narrowly focused tasks. It means there are not details of targeted activities and timing in the agreement. The next steps of Russia and Iran to develop relations will be to sign agreements of several areas between organizations of two countries.
Moreover, geoeconomically speaking, the expected entry into force of the free trade agreement between the EAEU and Iran in 2025 is much more practical than the strategic agreement. The temporary free trade agreement, which has been in effect since 2018, has allowed the trade turnover between the EAEU and Iran to double in 4 years — from $ 2.1 billion in 2019 to $ 4.1 billion in 2023. According to some assessments, the implementation of the new agreement will allow Russian businesses to save about 27 billion rubles a year on duties.
One contentious issue was whether the strategic agreement put an obligation on both sides to back each other in military conflicts. It does not. Russia does not want to fight against Israel or the United States directly; on the other hand it is difficult to believe that the Iranians wish to be killed for Russia in Ukraine. Besides, the reputation of Russia in Iranian public opinion is not stellar, with Iranian society perceiving Russia as a rogue Empire who «occupied Persian historical territories» in the 19th century. Distant as that sounds, the 19th century is in the society’s mindset as a Persian version of China’s «century of humiliation». Moreover, within Iranian internal politics, the tough competition between reformist and conservative wings of the ruling elite should not be forgotten as well. Russia may provide some new air defense systems, radars and EW systems to Iran; but most probably, Russia does not want to have a country with nuclear missiles in the region of its interests. However, Moscow also does not want to have a pro-western government to be in Tehran as well. So, Russia has to balance between those two of their nightmares.
Iran also wants to increase its presence in Russia and China, linking with regional organizations such as the EAEU, SCO and the BRICS. Participation in the work of these international institutions allows Tehran to diversify its foreign policy and ease the pressure of sanctions, helping solve its economic problems. Moreover, they could increase support for each other in international institutions such as in the UN. They are also reflected in the agreement.
Conclusion
Russia has been a major supplier of military equipment to Iran and after the start of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, while Iran has provided some equipment to Russia. Economic cooperation includes energy and trade routes like the INSTC, though these are fraught with economic, logistical and political issues.
The main factor which can be the decisive for Iran-Russia relations will be the incoming Trump administration. Yet several issues continue to trouble relations. They are the historical experiences of conflicting interests in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Bassin and in the Middle East. The concepts of collective security in the Persian Gulf region presented by Russia and Iran indicate the similarity of the parties’ positions on a number of issues. However, their implementation on a regional scale is impossible until the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and issues related to the Iranian nuclear program are resolved. Moreover, the recent developments in Syria weakened both of their positions in the Middle East.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Moscow and Tehran is aimed at expanding economic cooperation between the two countries, which they expect to allow them to weaken the negative impact of western sanctions. They want to join efforts to act together in Central Asia to balance other regional and global powers. Iranian experts stress that «the conclusion of this agreement means that Russia supports it in the face of confrontation with the United States, which is especially important given the possible negotiations between Russian Putin and Trump.» So, although it was announced several months before, what it is signing now may provide additional leverage to Moscow in expected negotiations between Russia and the United States and also, would support Iran’s weakening position in the region. Anyway, the agreement is the political declaration, a message to competitors and partners — but not a strategic plan.
In conclusion, the Strategic partnership agreement between Russia and Iran is a declaration of two countries largely estranged from the world, outlining their plans to join efforts and resist regional and global challenges they face. But it is not an alliance. The agreement is more symbolic than operationally binding. The partnership is seen as a joint response to global and regional challenges. However, Its success depends on actual deliverables, like military aid and infrastructure development. The real developments in strategic relations will be known, for instance, if new Russian military equipment will appear in military parades in Tehran or Iranian produced ones in the war in Ukraine
