Until January 2025, Moscow’s view of its adversaries remained strikingly straightforward: the United States occupied the top spot without challenge, the European Union played a distinctly secondary role — routinely dismissed as «taking orders from Washington» — and Ukraine was not recognized as an independent actor at all.
From Donald Trump’s second presidency the Kremlin expected (and still expects) decisive moves that could lower the temperature on at least some of the accumulated disputes, both in the European and the broader global security agenda. Throughout Trump’s term the White House has repeatedly shifted its line on the Russo-Ukrainian war, yet in official rhetoric and on state-controlled media the Kremlin has carefully avoided any direct criticism of the American president. Every setback has been blamed either on «Biden’s legacy» or on the actions of faceless «globalist elites» supposedly blocking progress.
The turning point came after the Putin-Trump summit in Alaska. Moscow radically rewrote its script: the European Union was now openly declared the main culprit behind the collapse of any prospects for a «peace deal». Vladimir Putin set the new tone in his October address at the Valdai Discussion Club; Sergei Lavrov promptly picked up the baton and fleshed it out.
In the official Russian worldview the EU is simultaneously «weak» and «dangerous» — two propositions that do not contradict but rather reinforce one another. The Union’s weakness is presented as an objective fact that dooms it to a gradual loss of global clout and growing internal fragmentation. Its danger, however, lies precisely in that weakness: multiplied by anti-Russian consolidation and fear of growing Russian influence, it allegedly forces Brussels to act with maximum harshness and «irrationality» while it still has the resources to do so.
The present analysis examines the core arguments the Kremlin and its aligned experts deploy to sustain this dual assessment.
The European Union is «weak»
For years Russian officials, propagandists and loyal analysts have hammered home — both at home and abroad — the narrative of the EU’s «degradation» and «declining relevance». Much of this is pure propaganda for propaganda’s sake. Still, five recurring lines of argument can be distilled from the flood of statements; taken together, they shape Russia’s overall posture toward the Union.
1.Crippling institutions
Russian analysts regard the EU’s rigid institutional architecture — which prevents rapid decision-making and adaptation to a chaotic world — as one of its chief vulnerabilities. The Union is almost permanently paralyzed by internal contradictions. A single Hungary is enough to derail the laborious process of aligning the positions of all other member states. In other words, a more centralized EU would pose a far greater threat to Russia. With the rise of right-wing parties, Moscow believes the ability of EU countries to reach agreement among themselves will only deteriorate further.
2. No shared vision of the future
The arrival in several member states of nationally-oriented forces for whom the pan-European agenda is secondary has, in Moscow’s view, rendered the EU incapable of forging a common vision of its future — especially in foreign policy and on the role of supranational institutions. This is interpreted as a fundamental inability to produce a strategy commensurate with contemporary challenges.
In the Russian mental map the most promising actors are those with a clear vision of their future and measurable criteria of success. Pride of place goes to Global South countries, followed by China, Russia and the United States; the EU is firmly relegated to last place — still influential but inexorably sliding.
3. Crumbling foundations
Particular attention is paid to migration, which is said to be eroding the EU’s internal stability — rhetoric that almost exactly mirrors statements by European far-right parties and the Trump administration. The ageing of Europe’s population and mounting difficulties in sustaining social guarantees are highlighted: in the long run member states will inevitably prove unable to maintain current benefit levels. Finally, the loss of cheap Russian gas is portrayed as having broken the main engines of economic growth, condemning the Union to further deceleration of already anemic rates.
4. Crisis of governance
Much is made of the «crisis of European elites» in both domestic and foreign policy. With the exception of nationally-oriented leaders, European politicians are judged incapable of coping with existing challenges. The near-total loss of French influence in Africa — successfully filled by the United States, Russia and China — is regularly cited as a textbook failure.
5. The United States as the EU’s real problem
The greatest misfortune of the European Union, according to Russian officials and analysts, is the complete subordination of its members’ interests to Washington’s foreign-policy course. This theme has been especially prominent since 2022 and continued right up to Trump’s return to the White House. In late 2024 Valdai Club experts wrote: «The events of 2022−2024 were accompanied by a strengthening of transatlantic ties and a diminution of Europe’s agency in international affairs, its unswerving adherence to the American wake.»
The tough, proactive EU policy in the early years of Russia’s war against Ukraine was depicted exclusively as the execution of U.S. instructions — with the transparent hint that without Biden relations with Russia could have developed differently. Even after Trump’s inauguration Kremlin-aligned commentators continued to stress Europe’s junior role: «After brief hesitation America’s European allies discarded illusions of democratic equality and began mastering Donald Trump’s preferred mode of communication — showering him with royal honors and practicing flattery.» This line dominated until August 2025, when the EU abruptly became, in Moscow’s eyes, the principal obstacle to achieving Russia’s objectives in Ukraine.
Needless to say, exaggeration and deliberate distortion are present across all five points. Yet it is precisely these narratives that determine Russian perceptions of the EU’s future and consolidate the conviction of its systemic weakness.
The European Union is «dangerous»
Despite the constant talk of the EU’s «sunset» and frailty, Russian officials and aligned experts nevertheless identify several factors that pose long-term risks for Moscow.
1.Anti-Russian consolidation
European political elites, for all their alleged «inability to solve problems», have succeeded — in the Russian view — in uniting around the perception of Russia as the primary long-term security threat. Since modernizing European armed forces will take four to five years, Moscow believes the EU will do everything possible to prolong the war in Ukraine and derail any peace process — precisely in order to buy time for building containment infrastructure against Russian «aggression». Keeping an external enemy, the argument runs, is politically profitable for European elites because it helps preserve relative internal unity.
2. Permanent hostility
For the Russian elite it is self-evident that whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, the balance of power in Europe will be radically reconfigured. The baseline scenario remains a Russian victory that dramatically strengthens Moscow’s position in Eastern Europe. Yet no one in the Kremlin harbors illusions: the EU will not reconcile itself to the new realities only with the greatest reluctance; hostility between Russia and the Union will become permanent, anti-Russian consolidation will intensify, and the defense spending race in Europe will accelerate.
3. The uncertainty of the U.S. factor
The crucial variable, according to experts close to the Kremlin, is the degree of continued American engagement. If Donald Trump fulfils his campaign promises and sharply reduces U.S. military presence in Europe — thereby weakening the «American security umbrella» — EU states will have to behave far more cautiously. If the status quo persists, however, even the largest European countries will, in Moscow’s view, «behave like the former Baltic republics of the Soviet Union» — pursuing a tough, principled and consistent anti-Russian policy.
Elite turnover and acceptance of new realities
Moscow also discusses a more favorable — from its perspective — European dynamic.
First, a gradual change of the guard is under way. Vladimir Putin, in his latest Valdai appearance, once again highlighted the positive trend of growing influence of «healthy» political forces in Europe. Moscow is prepared — to the extent feasible — to facilitate the rise of nationally-oriented politicians who oppose further increases in military spending, aid to Kyiv and sanctions, and who favor the return of Russian gas.
In 2025 confidence that «globalist elites» will inevitably be replaced by new faces reached its zenith. A possible reduction in American military presence under Trump is seen by Valdai experts as a catalyst: «If Europe’s only objective foreign-policy function — serving as a deployment area for U.S. forces and assets in the event of conflict with Russia — is diminished, new politicians with a new worldview and new professional qualities will be in demand.»
Second, Kremlin-aligned analysts are convinced that as soon as the outcome of the war in Ukraine becomes indisputable, the EU will seize the first opportunity to restore at least part of pre-war economic cooperation. Even four years of fighting have not produced a complete severance of trade ties, so pragmatic interests — above all cheap energy and renewed access to the Russian market — will quickly outweigh ideq3ological rhetoric, Valdai participants argue.
Third, Moscow regards a revision of the world order as inevitable. The chief architects and beneficiaries of the rules of the past three decades — the United States and the EU — will be forced to acknowledge new realities. Washington under Trump is already actively moving away from the old norms, which means that Russia’s gains in Ukraine will in time receive international recognition and sanctions will be lifted.
As long as the war continues and the EU remains Kyiv’s principal backer, Moscow will support any processes and forces capable of exacerbating internal contradictions inside the Union. But the moment the situation on the Ukrainian front changes decisively, the Kremlin will immediately offer to restore a substantial part of pre-war cooperation — on condition that Brussels recognizes the new geopolitical realities in Eastern Europe and Russian regional dominance.
Scenarios in which Russia suffers defeat in the war are simply not entertained in official discourse or among experts close to the authorities.
