Last week, the new composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) held its first meeting and elected its leadership. That said, calling this lineup «new» is something of a stretch: 12 of the 15 members from the previous commission kept their seats, while the top leadership remained entirely unchanged. Ella Pamfilova was re-elected chair, Nikolai Bulaev her deputy, and Natalya Budarina secretary of the commission. This is the team that will organize the State Duma elections in September 2026.
Pamfilova has led the CEC since 2016. This new term will be her third — something of a record. No one before her has held the post for more than two terms. The appointment of the 75-year-old Pamfilova is a vivid illustration of personnel policy in the late Putin era: ultra-conservative and extremely cautious. The president clearly prefers to work with familiar, thoroughly vetted people in key positions.
Records for longevity in high office have already been set by Presidential Administration head Anton Vaino and Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Sergei Kiriyenko, who oversees the Kremlin’s political bloc, are not far behind. Pamfilova’s reappointment also depended in part on the position of Kiriyenko and his team. They understand Putin’s preferences well and are happy to indulge them.
Putin himself spoke highly of Pamfilova’s loyalty and her willingness to continue in a rather stressful job. The president personally attended the CEC’s first meeting and delivered a speech about enemy interference in elections and Russian «democracy.»
«Competitive, democratic elections are an essential, irreplaceable, constitutional tool for forming a strong, capable government,» the president declared.
In response, Pamfilova touched on one of the head of state’s favorite topics: participants in the war. She assured Putin that members of the military are among the most active voters: «Many participants in the special military operation — and I know this for a fact from talking to them — are among the most active voters, because they understand exactly what they are fighting for, and it matters to them who gets elected and who will come to power where their families live.»
Over ten years at the CEC, Ella Pamfilova — once viewed as a moderate liberal before taking the job — has transformed into a model functionary of the Putin system. Her appointment ahead of the 2016 Duma elections was lobbied by Vyacheslav Volodin, who at the time oversaw the Kremlin’s political bloc. Volodin had arrived in the Kremlin amid protests over the 2011 Duma campaign, when tens of thousands took to the streets and squares of Russian cities to protest vote rigging. One of the protesters’ main demands was the resignation of then-CEC chairman Vladimir Churov, who had become the symbol of electoral fraud.
Volodin saved that resignation for the next parliamentary campaign, using Churov as a lightning rod to absorb all the negativity from the politically engaged part of society regarding the elections. In his place came Pamfilova — someone who, before the elections, actively engaged with independent observers and spoke of her intention to make the electoral system more open and transparent.
The 2016 elections were held under the old rules, but Volodin’s main innovation was «drying up» turnout: polling stations were mostly attended by voters dependent on the authorities, while the protest electorate stayed home. As a result, the need for crude falsification dropped noticeably. The campaign sparked almost no major protests, and afterward Pamfilova continued cooperating with independent observers.
Soon, however, the Kremlin’s political curator changed. Sergei Kiriyenko, the former head of Rosatom, took over. His corporate-style approach involved strict KPIs for turnout and United Russia’s results, which inevitably led to greater use of administrative resources and falsifications. Pamfilova adapted to the new rules fairly quickly. She gradually curtailed contacts with independent observers, began harshly criticizing the West for «interference» in Russian elections, and became Kiriyenko’s loyal aide in setting records for «popular support.»
During the plebiscite on constitutional amendments, opportunities for falsification reached a new level thanks to multi-day voting. The commission’s arsenal gained remote electronic voting (DEG), which effectively turned Moscow — traditionally a protest-prone region — into something resembling an «electoral sultanate». The rights of independent observers were steadily curtailed, until observer status remained only for candidates from systemic parties and individuals approved by public chambers.
Pamfilova defended the «Kiriyenko-style» results of federal elections and the new methods with complete seriousness — unlike Vladimir Churov, who sometimes allowed himself a touch of irony. She publicly supported the war and, in the first months of the full-scale invasion, appeared in public wearing a Z-shaped brooch. Over ten years, she has worked hand-in-glove with the Kremlin’s curator on the commission — Nikolai Bulaev, a former United Russia State Duma deputy and ex-senator responsible in the CEC for deploying administrative resources and liaising with government bodies.
By political logic, even accounting for the peculiarities of the Russian system, replacing Pamfilova on the eve of the Duma elections would have seemed quite expected. The State Duma campaign is taking place for the first time in many years amid a serious crisis. Society is tired of the war, prices continue to rise, the internet is becoming less free, and layoffs are happening at enterprises. The ratings of the authorities and United Russia are objectively declining. Replacing Pamfilova — who has long been firmly associated in the minds of politically engaged voters with the new methods of falsification — could have at least temporarily boosted trust in the elections. The Kremlin could have, as Volodin once did with Churov, «replaced the clogged filter.» However, neither Putin nor Kiriyenko went for it.
Pamfilova’s record third term makes one thing clear: in this campaign, the opinion of the voter essentially means nothing to the country’s top leadership. Far more important are the well-oiled methods for delivering the required KPIs, which the Pamfilova-led CEC has mastered to perfection. Moreover, Pamfilova herself is already announcing new techniques that should help United Russia secure the result the Kremlin wants.
Volodin‘s Move
State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin has submitted documents to participate in United Russia’s primaries for the federal parliament in his home Saratov region. He will compete in the selection both in the single-mandate district and on the party list.
The seasoned politician understands perfectly well that there are no ironclad guarantees he will keep the speaker’s post. In the Presidential Administration’s political bloc, there is interest in seeing a more controllable and less independent figure in that role. The chairmanship of the State Duma also interests Dmitry Medvedev, who, since stepping down as prime minister, has not received a significant position in the power vertical.
Volodin is taking advantage of the opportunity to run in the primaries — this is not a backroom decision, as the system’s rules allow such a maneuver. The speaker maintains control over the administrative resources in Saratov Oblast, which is headed by his protégé Roman Busargin. Winning the preliminary vote will therefore be no problem for him.
After participating in the primaries and then the elections, Volodin will have a stronger position for negotiation. It will be harder to deny him reappointment as speaker — especially if the Kremlin does not offer him a worthy alternative as compensation.
Bureaucrat in the Faction
Former Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Governor Dmitry Kobylkin will head the United Russia faction in the State Duma. After leaving the governor’s office, he spent a long time chairing the federal parliament’s committee on natural resources, until that post was given as compensation to ex-Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov.
Duma committee chairs have long since turned into bureaucrats well known to the government and the presidential administration. They can skillfully shepherd executive-branch bills through the legislature, help draft such documents if needed, or block unwelcome deputy initiatives. Figures like Pavel Krasheninnikov and Andrey Makarov fit this mold. In more recent times, former ministers have begun heading committees. However, this bureaucratization has not yet extended to the directly political work in the Duma. Leading the faction has always been considered political work. As a result, United Russia’s parliamentary coordinators have either been people with serious standing and weight in the power vertical or figures with public experience and charisma.
The first head of the United Russia faction was Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov — a former high-ranking security-services figure personally acquainted with Vladimir Putin. He was succeeded by Andrey Vorobyov, who had previously headed the party’s executive committee for several years. After him came Vladimir Vasilyev — another former silovik, but with experience as a deputy. Next was Sergei Neverov, a trusted associate of Vyacheslav Volodin who maintained close contact with the Kremlin; Neverov also had substantial political experience dating back to the 1990s in Kemerovo Oblast. Currently, the faction is still led by Vladimir Vasilyev.
Dmitry Kobylkin’s appointment as faction leader signals the final bureaucratization of the State Duma’s work. As governor, he favored rigid administrative methods. Kobylkin is accustomed to building a vertical through bureaucratic rather than political means. Even in its current state, United Russia is theoretically capable of generating internal conflicts. Kobylkin, who was initially close to the NOVATEK team, later built good relations with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s circle and established ties with the presidential administration’s political bloc, will suppress conflicts within the party with the harshness of a bureaucrat rather than moderate them with the flexibility of a politician.
