At the end of this week, Russia’s Supreme Court declared Memorial’s center an extremist organization, while security forces raided the Moscow editorial offices of Novaya Gazeta. Notably, Memorial was labeled an «international public movement,» despite the fact that no such formal structure exists. Russia had previously declared the nonexistent «international LGBT movement» extremist as well.
Novaya Gazeta’s editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov and Memorial (as a network of centers) were both awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. For a time, this distinction served as a kind of protective shield for them. Vladimir Putin long adhered to certain rules of the game—or rather, «understandings”—and treated «old-school» human rights defenders with pointed respect. In 2017, he even personally congratulated Lyudmila Alekseeva, chairwoman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, on her 90th birthday, visiting her at home.
Memorial’s structures were formally liquidated by court and Prosecutor General’s Office decisions back in 2021, but they were not then designated as an «undesirable» organization, let alone an «extremist» one. International Memorial chairman Oleg Orlov was convicted in 2024, though the formal charge against him was «discrediting the army» (one could say it was a conviction in his personal capacity). He was later released as part of a prisoner exchange between Russia and Western countries. Memorial only received undesirable-organization status this past February.
Novaya Gazeta has not yet received full-blown repressive designations, but it has already been stripped of its media license and can no longer publish a mass-circulation print edition. Editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov has been declared a foreign agent. The outlet’s staff have found ways to continue operating: they now publish the small-circulation magazine «NO» and maintain the website.
Because of all these bans and restrictions, neither Memorial nor Novaya Gazeta could any longer be called «reserves» where the old rules of the game still applied. Nevertheless, the truncated version of Novaya continued to operate and produce reporting from a country at war. Now its journalists have received an unmistakably clear signal: the Russian authorities consider their previous format of work impossible. Continuing Memorial’s practices could lead to criminal charges under the extremism statute.
The extremist label applied to Memorial and the fresh repressive measures against Novaya Gazeta journalists publicly record the country’s definitive transition to a new status. In reality, this transition occurred long ago; it has now simply received clear symbolic confirmation.
The Art of the Announcement
Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev reported that the state corporation is testing a new engine for deep-space missions. «On our test stands, we have achieved unique performance characteristics for a pulsed plasma engine, with an individual impulse of up to 100 kilometers per second. This is, of course, a qualitative leap over chemical propulsion solutions,» he stated at the Russian Space Forum.
Rosatom was long headed by Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy head of the Presidential Administration. He successfully handed the director-general post to his close associate and longtime acquaintance from their days in the Gorky Komsomol regional committee, Alexey Likhachev. Kiriyenko himself chairs the corporation’s supervisory board.
Rosatom can confidently be counted among the structures of the «big political bloc» under the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration. It serves as an important personnel pipeline: corporation employees move into the Kremlin and affiliated bodies, and the traffic flows both ways. Rosatom sponsors political-bloc events, and its exhibits formed one of the centerpieces of Putin’s pre-election «Russia» exhibition, later transformed into the eponymous «national center.» It is there that the Space Forum is currently taking place.
Likhachev’s remarks are part of the public positioning of Sergei Kiriyenko’s «big political bloc.» Like most events organized by his team, they are primarily addressed to the country’s top leadership—and more precisely, to Vladimir Putin personally. Kiriyenko has consistently built a comfortable, fully controlled environment around the president. In this picture, Putin enjoys enormous popularity according to official figures, is surrounded by loyal and ambitious youth alongside «veterans,» and the country—despite the challenges of wartime—confidently advances innovations. In this way, the president is enveloped in positive news.
The «plasma engine,» which remains at the test-stand stage and is unlikely to see real deployment in the foreseeable future, fits perfectly into this narrative. Against the backdrop of a real American spacecraft flight to the Moon, Alexey Likhachev announces a wonder technology that sounds far more impressive. As is often the case with «big political bloc» projects, final implementation depends on partner organizations—in this case, Roscosmos. For the «external contour,» it relies on pro-Russian structures in other countries. This tactic has so far allowed Kiriyenko’s team to successfully lean on high-profile announcements, while shifting blame to partners in case of non-delivery.
Gosuslugi for the LDPR
Russia’s state portal Gosuslugi has mass-mailed users invitations to an exhibition honoring the late founder of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) titled «Zhirinovsky. The Continuation.» The event is scheduled for next week at the Manege center, which belongs to the Moscow city authorities.
One of the exhibition’s centerpieces will be a train. Vladimir Zhirinovsky used to launch LDPR campaign trains ahead of key elections for the party. As the announcement states, the exhibition train will travel «through the key stages of Zhirinovsky’s life and political path: from ‘Childhood’ and student years to ‘Political Struggle’ and the station ‘My Predictions Came True.’»
Formally, the LDPR will be listed as the organizer, and the event will form a key element of the party’s parliamentary election campaign. The current Liberal Democratic leadership and the political technologists supplied by the Kremlin build most party campaigns around the image of the deceased leader: they remind voters of his «predictions» and launch viral videos of his fiery speeches on social media. An exhibition in his honor is the quintessence of this approach.
Following the founder’s death, the LDPR has become a party fully controlled by the Presidential Administration’s political bloc. Current leader Leonid Slutsky has never stood out for political talent and is mainly known for harassment scandals involving female parliamentary journalists. He quickly clashed with the old party guard and sidelined the most ambitious figures who could claim to succeed Zhirinovsky—most notably State Duma Committee on Social Policy head Yaroslav Nilov.
Despite these issues, the Presidential Administration not long ago wanted to push the LDPR into second place, displacing the CPRF. The task seemed relatively feasible: the Liberal Democrats consistently held third place in the polls. According to official data, the gap between the LDPR and the Communists remained small while Zhirinovsky was alive, and the parties occasionally swapped positions. However, the Liberal Democrats never developed a new identity, and Slutsky himself—who is likely to head the federal list again in the parliamentary elections—managed only fourth place in the presidential race.
Judging by the latest signals, Kremlin preferences have shifted. The political bloc is now actively testing the elevation of the «New People» party to second place using mildly protest-oriented rhetoric. Slutsky and his team long ago bet on unconditional support for Vladimir Putin and the war, making any pivot toward even vague protest statements on current issues impossible for them.
At the same time, the Presidential Administration has no intention of completely abandoning the LDPR, as evidenced by support for its campaign through Gosuslugi and the provision of state venues. The goal of this tactic may be to further humiliate the Communists by pushing them not just to third place, but to fourth.
In its current form, the LDPR perfectly matches the vision of Presidential Administration political-bloc head Sergei Kiriyenko: parties as highly artificial, fully controllable constructs tailored to specific segments of society. Yet this approach has obvious drawbacks. The excessive «statization» of the LDPR risks disorienting part of the loyalist electorate and diverting its votes from United Russia to the Liberal Democrats. Given the ruling party’s declining ratings, this could significantly complicate the political bloc’s ability to meet its assigned KPIs.
