The Black Sea region has historically struggled to offer effective regional cooperation initiatives. Efforts for regional cooperation in the post-Cold War period vanished under the grip of Russia’s military interventions, resulting in frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia and an excruciating war in Ukraine. However, since 24 February 2022, the Black Sea has become a key battlefield. Ukraine’s military successes against Russia’s Black Sea fleet shaped the power balance in the sea while the region emerged as an important corridor connecting resource-rich Central Asia with Europe. These geopolitical shifts create a momentum for new policies that reflect emerging security threats. Taking this into consideration, in 2024, more than two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Council adopted conclusions inviting the European Commission and the European External Action Service to prepare a joint communication on how to establish a «strategic approach» to the Black Sea while an EU Black Sea strategy focusing on regional cooperation, economic investment and security is among the deliverables of the 2025 Commission work programme.
Evolving regional trends
Situated between former imperial powers and former Soviet republics and satellites, the Black Sea region inherits a legacy of cultural diversity, divergent geopolitical objectives, and asymmetric state capacities. Unlike the Mediterranean or the Baltic seas, which cultivate a shared identity and culture, the Black Sea region lacks collective identity.
After the end of the Cold war, the Black Sea saw «years of neglect» as the Euro-Atlantic community paid little attention to it, allowing Turkey to push forward its own vision of regional cooperation. This vision rests upon principles of regional ownership and multilateral cooperation; the aim is to deter Russia and prevent third actors from entering the region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), established in 1992, is the epitome of this. It prioritises areas like transport, energy, and tourism. Turkey also pushed for security initiatives like BlackSeaFor and Black Sea Harmony to address regional security threats, especially after 9/11. However, Russia’s revisionist actions undermined regional cooperation, with its support for separatist forces in Moldova and Georgia exacerbating frozen conflicts and complicating the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the two countries.
In the meantime, Bulgaria and Romania joined both NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. This provided the EU with access to the Black Sea along with the responsibility to offer a strategy for a region comprising of countries with aspirations to join the Union. In 2007, the EU launched the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) explicitly stating it was not an EU strategy for the region as the broad EU policy towards the region was already set out in the pre-accession strategy with Turkey, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Strategic Partnership with Russia. The aim of the BSS was complementary to other policies, aimed to boost regional cooperation, democratic transformation and internal consolidation of the region.
The Black Sea Synergy is a cautious attempt for defining EU’s interest in the Black Sea region in the aftermath of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU. On the other hand, both the BSEC and the BSS served Russia’s interests to keep its hard power dominance by not mentioning hard security. Involving Russia in these regional initiatives was doomed to fail because of the general shift in Russia’s foreign policy from cooperative to non-cooperative hegemony. With the Black Sea becoming an arena of projection of Russia’s global power, the EU launched in 2009 the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative as the Eastern dimension of the ENP. This was the initiative best suited to serve EU’s interests for democratic transformation in the wider Europe region. The EaP was designed to foster resilience, economic integration, and political association with six post-Soviet states: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Over time, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have made significant progress toward EU integration, with all three being granted EU candidate status in 2022. Belarus, however, suspended its participation while Armenia and Azerbaijan have grappled with persistent tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh, complicating their engagement with the initiative.
The EaP did not prevent Russia’s assertive foreign policy in the post-Soviet space justified by the concept of Russkiy Mir (русский мир). Though the war in Ukraine acted as a catalyst to the debate of EU enlargement, the ongoing war, the frozen conflicts in addition to the fragile state of the democracies, represent an unprecedented challenge for EU’s accession process of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. As of now, EU member states have yet to develop a comprehensive strategy for integrating Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova given the complexities. The enlargement process faces additional challenges, including the need for institutional reform within the EU to accommodate new members and the potential economic ramifications of further expansion.
In the meantime, Turkey performing its balancing act in the Black Sea is emerging as the most stable factor there. Ankara’s control over the Straits puts it in a privileged position to control access for non-littoral ships. Ankara controls the transit and navigation of commercial and war vessels through the Straits (the Bosphorus, the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara) via the provisions of the 1936 Convention regarding the regime of the Straits (also known as the Montreux Convention). Right after Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on 28 February 2022, Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced the application of the Montreux Convention by defining Russia’s aggression as war. Turkey closed the Straits for the passage of warships of the warring parties except in case the warship was returning to its base in the Black Sea. The same steps were undertaken in 2008 during the Russo-Georgian war.
Ankara’s vision for local ownership in the Black Sea aligns with Russia’s interests by limiting the presence of non-littoral naval forces in the region. This alignment creates a relationship of mutual benefit between Ankara and Moscow, but not necessarily an alliance. The significance of this dynamic was put to the test during the war in Ukraine. Prior to February 2022, Turkey had been expanding its military-technical cooperation with Ukraine, extending it to include military intelligence sharing and joint training exercises. At the same time, Ankara did not support the West in its sanctions policy against Russia, but it brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2022, ensuring the export of the Ukrainian grain through the Bosphorus. This puts Turkey in a unique position in the region — Ankara provides NATO with 67% of Black Sea maritime intelligence; it is simultaneously able to pursue its own strategic interests that sometimes challenge Russia’s interests, yet without provoking escalation. This posture makes Ankara indispensable factor in the future EU Strategy for the Black Sea.
State of EU littoral states: responsibility against weak capabilities and fragile political systems
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s security has been directly affected by Russia’s actions in the Black Sea. In July 2023, Russia declared a temporary warning area in the Black Sea, encompassing parts of Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), under the pretext of conducting naval exercises. This action blocked significant parts of Bulgaria’s EEZ, disrupting maritime activities and the freedom of navigation. NATO allies described Russia’s actions as introducing new risks of miscalculation and escalation, as well as serious impediments to freedom of navigation. These developments led to increased modernisation efforts. The Bulgarian navy is set to receive two advanced multipurpose modular patrol vessels (MMPVs) to be handed to the Bulgarian navy by the end of 2025 and 2026 respectively. The vessels will be equipped with advanced weaponry. At the same time, a procurement procedure is on the way for the purchase of Link 22 communication systems from the US for the new warships which will make more secure the exchange of data with NATO aircraft and systems.
Romania, on its end, most recently has deployed F-16 fighter jets after a Russian drone violated its airspace. This incident was preceded by other similar violations which Romanian authorities described as violating international law and a threat to regional security in the Black Sea and NATO’s Eastern Flank. Russia’s war has prompted Romania to modernise its navy too, boosting investments in the defence sector. The Romanian Parliament approved a significant procurement plan, including the acquisition of two Scorpène-class submarines from France, marking Romania as the third Black Sea country, after Russia and Turkey, to operate submarines.
Both Sofia and Bucharest are participating in NATO’s efforts to strengthen the Eastern Flank. The two have explored ways to cooperate more closely and the efforts materialised, inter alia, in the creation of Regional Special Operations Command for the Black Sea (HQ R-SOCC) through Command and Control (C2) structure. In 2024, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey launched the Mine Countermeasures Task Group Black Sea (MCM Black Sea) to clear the mines posing a big danger for the navigation. It is a joint mission open to other NATO members and a useful learning exercise for joint missions during wartime. The US Navy has recently participated in exercises alongside the MCM group.
Despite these efforts, both Bulgaria and Romania face challenges in addressing the Russian threat in the Black Sea. Both countries are targets of Russia’s hybrid warfare, exercised by meddling into elections, espionage, disruptive information campaigns. Sofia and Bucharest are still relying on limited and outdated military capabilities, their fragile political systems are marked by tendencies of high-level corruption, the rise of populist projects, and foreign interference. Strengthening cooperation with Turkey through joint initiatives like the demining mission partially mitigate these shortcomings. Both countries stand to enhance their strategic importance in the region if the EU adopts a dedicated Black Sea strategy and puts military-technical thinking behind it in the context of its efforts to strengthen its defence capabilities.
Future prospects of EU policy in the region
The EU seems to have developed a framework through the Black Sea Synergy to assess maritime soft issues. The BSS could now be adapted to the growing geostrategic value of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or the Middle Corridor, as a growing geostrategic trade route between Asia and Europe, circumventing Russia’s Northern corridor. Similarly, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) could be on the cusp of being revitalised to address current geopolitical realities. Despite its limitations, proposals such as reviving the «Group of Friends of the Eastern Partnership» have been suggested as a way to enhance the EU’s capacity to support member states in resisting Russian aggression; recommendations for the EU to invest in security sector reform and capacity building within its neighbourhood offer a pathway to bolstering regional resilience.
Both the BSS and the EaP find themselves integral to a future EU approach towards the Black Sea, updated with a focus on security. This strategy might reflect the EU’s recognition of the Black Sea’s critical role in advancing European defence, especially in a future where the region assumes greater strategic importance amid reduced U.S. involvement.
The Black Sea also serves as an entry point for numerous risks that subsequently permeate the rest of Europe, such as drug trafficking and Russia’s circumvention of sanctions. The war led to shifts in drug trafficking routes aimed at circumventing Ukraine and the Northern route via Russia. Analyses suggest the emergence of alternative routes while recent big seizures in Bulgarian ports confirm shifting dynamics. The Black Sea — just like the Baltic Sea, is an area where Russia circumvents sanctions imposed by the U.S., the UK and the EU on the Russian oil industry by «deploying a fleet of rusty tankers», or vessels that participate in high-risk shipping practices to facilitate illicit or sanctionable activity. Apart from avoiding Western sanctions, the «shadow fleet» can cause ecological disasters as seen in the Black Sea.
The future EU strategy for the Black Sea will have to confront Russia’s established strategic concept for the region, which is unlikely to change regardless of how the war in Ukraine unfolds. Moscow is expected to uphold its political grip over countries in the region — mainly in Georgia, and continue viewing the Black Sea as a key geopolitical gateway to other strategically important areas.
The Kremlin’s interests to keep its political and military dominance in the wider Black Sea region can be noted in the Russian draft documents on legal security guarantees from the United States and NATO from December 2021. Russia’s ambition was once again reconfirmed by its demand for NATO to withdraw troops, weapons and military equipment from Bulgaria and Romania, thus restoring the 1997 configuration of the Alliance. Combined with the hybrid attacks marked by Kremlin’s footprint throughout the region — in Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, and Romania, it is evident that Russia’s interest lies in restoring a post-Cold war sphere of influence.
But the Black Sea’s importance goes much further for Moscow. The Black Sea has traditionally served as a critical access point for Moscow’s operations in the Mediterranean, but with the Turkish Straits now being closed, Russia faces increased logistical costs. This is especially evident following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria, when Russia had to transfer military hardware from the lost Tartus naval base to Russian Baltic ports. This prolonged route has another disadvantage for Russia — NATO allies are improving their coordination in the English Channel and the Baltic Sea, particularly for the protection of critical infrastructure. Given these trends, Russia has a strong interest in securing Turkey’s cooperation to reopen the Straits, which would provide it with quicker access to North Africa and, from there, further into the continent — an area of increasing economic, military, and diplomatic significance for the Kremlin to the detriment of the West.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has altered the existing perception of the Black Sea. The war underscores the geopolitical importance of both the region and Bulgaria and Romania as littoral countries. The European Commission can lead efforts to develop a new strategy for the Black Sea region that addresses the imperatives of post-war perspectives. To accomplish this, the EU and its member states should prioritise the identification of their trade, energy, and political interests in the region, align them with existing strategic frameworks — primarily the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership — and upgrade them accordingly. Putting serious money into the Middle Corridor will yield returns both economically and geopolitically, increasing EU influence in Central Asia, a region where it has been waning. Any Black Sea strategy should include coordination with Turkey with Bulgaria and Romania taking a leading role. Ankara will cooperate whenever it is treated on equal footing as a regional power with increased influence in the neighbouring regions, and whenever the activities keep the sea safe in order to deter Russia and benefit from the economic opportunities it provides. For now, it seems that France, the United Kingdom and Poland are dedicating special attention to the future of the Black Sea and more countries will follow as the sea reveals its potential in new geopolitical realities. Europe’s security awakening following the drift in the transatlantic relations — and its ability to deter Russia effectively — will first be tested in the Black Sea.
