



## Vulnerability Assessment of Russian Systems Using Chinese Microelectronics

Model*	Type of Weapon / Technology	Manufacturer	Contains China-manufactured microchips <sup>***</sup>	Vulnerability to remote access	Technical means of compromise
<b>Platforma-M</b>	Combat UGV	NITI Progress	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>Nerekhta</b>	Combat UGV	Degtyaryov Plant and Advanced Research Foundation (ARF)	Unlikely/Unknown	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Soratnik</b>	Combat UGV	Rostec	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>Kungas</b>	UGV Swarm Concept	Special Engineering Design Bureau	Unlikely/Unknown	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Scarab</b>	Demining UGV, short-range	CET-1	Unlikely/Unknown	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Sphera</b>	Demining UGV, short-range	CET-1	Unlikely/Unknown	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Marker</b>	UGV RDT&E Concept	ARF	Likely	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Uran-6</b>	Demining UGV, short-range	JSC 766 UPTK (Kalashnikov-Rostec)	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>Uran-9</b>	Combat UGV	JSC 766 UPTK (Kalashnikov-Rostec)	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>Uran-14</b>	Firefighting UGV	JSC 766 UPTK (Kalashnikov-Rostec)	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>Udar</b>	Combat UGV	Rostec	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>Prohod-1</b>	Heavy Demining UGV	High Precision Weapons JSC	Unlikely/Unknown	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Shturm</b>	Heavy UGV for Urban Combat	Uralvagonozavod	Unlikely/Unknown	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>T-14 Armata</b>	Next-Generation MBT (autonomous/semi-autonomous)	Rostec	Likely	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Nudol system</b>	Ground-based ASAT missile interceptor	JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey	Likely	Possible	Targeted EW disruption or spoofing
<b>S-500 system</b>	Air-defence system with potential ASAT	JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey	Likely	Possible	Targeted EW disruption or spoofing
<b>Burevestnik (space)</b>	Air-based space launcher	Krasnoarmeysk Scientific Research Institute of Mechanization (KNIIM)	Likely	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path

<b>Peresvet</b>	Laser system for satellites/missile blinding	Russian Ministry of Defense	Likely	Unlikely	Vulnerable to optical or electromagnetic countermeasures
<b>Tirada-2</b>	EW system against communication satellites	Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Russia	Likely	Possible	RF interference spoofing, jamming override
<b>Bylina-MM</b>	EW system for satellite signal disruption	Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Russia	Likely	Possible	RF interference spoofing, jamming override
<b>Krasukha-4</b>	Radar satellite counter-system	Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET)	Likely	Possible	RF interference spoofing, jamming override
<b>Divnomorye</b>	Radar satellite counter-system	Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET)	Likely	Possible	RF interference spoofing, jamming override
<b>Tobol</b>	Satellite protection system	Russian Space Systems (RKS)	Likely	Unknown	Unknown or low-resolution compromise path
<b>Avangard</b>	Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)	NPO Mashinostroyeniya	Likely	Possible	Potential firmware backdoors or hardware trojans in COTS components (guidance, nav, comms)
<b>Sarmat</b>	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)	Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau	Likely	Possible	Potential firmware backdoors or hardware trojans in COTS components (guidance, nav, comms)
<b>Poseidon</b>	Nuclear-Powered UUV	Rubin Design Bureau	Likely	Possible	Potential firmware backdoors or hardware trojans in COTS components (guidance, nav, comms)
<b>Burevestnik (missile)</b>	Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile	Novator Design Bureau	Unlikely/Unknown	Possible	Potential firmware backdoors or hardware trojans in COTS components (guidance, nav, comms)
<b>Kinzhal</b>	Air-Launched Ballistic Missile	Design Bureau of Machine-Building (KBM)	Likely	Possible	Potential firmware backdoors or hardware trojans in COTS components (guidance, nav, comms)
<b>Tsirkon (Zircon)</b>	Hypersonic Cruise Missile	NPO Mashinostroyeniya	Unlikely/Unknown	Possible	Potential firmware backdoors or hardware trojans in COTS components (guidance, nav, comms)
<b>Garpiya-3 (G3)</b>	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	Unknown	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection
<b>DLE30 engines</b>	Aircraft Engine	DLE (China)	Likely	Possible	Engine control manipulation, ECU override
<b>DLE55 aircraft engines</b>	Aircraft Engine	DLE (China)	Likely	Possible	Engine control manipulation, ECU override
<b>DLE60 aircraft engines</b>	Aircraft Engine	DLE (China)	Likely	Possible	Engine control manipulation, ECU override
<b>DLE120 aircraft engines</b>	Aircraft Engine	DLE (China)	Likely	Possible	Engine control manipulation, ECU override
<b>Orlan-10 UAV microchips</b>	UAV Microelectronics	Various (including Chinese suppliers)	Likely	Yes	Telemetry hijack, backdoors, malware injection

\* Weapons and technology are composed on the basis of the “Advanced military technology in Russia” [report](#)

\*\* Both, military-grade chips and COTS components